Little v. Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Background

Michael Little alleged that PG&E discriminated and retaliated against him because of his disability. He alleged that, after being shocked by 12,000 volts of electricity in December 2014, PG&E made derogatory comments, placed him on an administrative action plan, failed to accommodate disability requests, delayed his promotion, segregated him from other workers, and failed to prevent further discrimination related to his disability and safety complaints.

Little filed four claims in San Francisco Superior Court: disability discrimination and harassment under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA); retaliation under the FEHA; failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation under the FEHA; and intentional infliction of emotional distress. PG&E removed the case to federal court, asserting federal-question jurisdiction and arguing that Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act preempted Little’s state-law claims because they were governed by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Little moved to remand the case to state court, and PG&E moved to dismiss the complaint.

Motion to Remand

The court applied the Ninth Circuit’s two-step test for Section 301 preemption. First, it asked whether the claims sought to enforce rights or duties created by the CBA. Second, if not, it asked whether resolving the state-law claims would substantially depend on interpreting the CBA.

The court concluded that Little’s FEHA discrimination and retaliation claims were based on rights created and enforced by state law, not exclusively on the CBA. The court also found that the claims focused on PG&E’s conduct and procedures rather than the meaning of CBA terms. A possible CBA-based defense, or merely consulting the CBA, was not enough to require preemption. The court reached the same conclusion for Little’s emotional-distress claim because it was based on the same conduct and allegations as the discrimination and retaliation claims.

Because the claims were not preempted under Section 301, the court granted Little’s motion to remand and directed the Clerk to return the case to San Francisco Superior Court.

Attorney’s Fees

Little requested $3,500 in attorney’s fees and costs incurred because of the removal. The court denied that request because Little did not provide evidence showing the amount of fees and costs actually incurred.

Other Motion and Disposition

The court denied as moot PG&E’s motion to dismiss. It also vacated the March 10, 2022 hearing and the April 14, 2022 federal case-management conference. Judge Thomas S. Hixson ordered the remand on March 1, 2022.