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N.D. Cal.Substantive rulingFiled Mar. 7, 2022

Hawthorne v. Kernan

Judge
Haywood Gilliam
Docket
4:17-cv-04960
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
20
Civil RightsSection 1983First AmendmentSummary Judgment
In one sentence

In Hawthorne v. Kernan, Judge Gilliam denied Swensen’s dismissal motion, granted other defendants’ summary-judgment motion, and kept claims against Yanez, Swensen, and Thomas.

Who this affects

Carlos A. Hawthorne’s claims against Swensen, Yanez, and Thomas continued. Fonesca, Davis, Hagens, and Czajkowski received summary judgment on all claims and were dismissed from the action; Thomas received summary judgment on the First Amendment religion and speech claims.

What happened

In Hawthorne v. Kernan, Carlos A. Hawthorne, an incarcerated person representing himself, sued under a federal civil-rights law. He alleged that prison officials confiscated his legal, religious, and reading materials in retaliation and violated his constitutional rights in other ways.

The court denied Sarah Swensen’s motion to dismiss, finding Hawthorne’s claims against her timely and adequately pleaded. It granted the other defendants’ motion for summary judgment because Hawthorne had not properly completed the prison grievance process for the claims against Fonesca, Davis, Hagens, Czajkowski, and some claims against Thomas. Fonesca, Davis, Hagens, and Czajkowski were dismissed from the action; claims against Yanez, Swensen, and Thomas remained.

Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. also partly granted and partly denied Swensen’s request for judicial notice, accepted the existence of one court document but not the truth of disputed statements in other records, and set a schedule for another dispositive motion.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Hawthorne v. Kernan · No. 4:17-cv-04960
Judge
Haywood Gilliam
Date
Mar. 7, 2022

Background

Carlos A. Hawthorne, an inmate at San Quentin State Prison, brought this action without a lawyer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court previously found that his amended complaint stated claims involving alleged retaliation for preparing a civil-rights complaint, confiscation of legal and religious materials and books, excessive force, and a threat related to his speech.

The pending motions were: (1) defendant Sarah Swensen’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim; and (2) defendants Czajkowski, Davis, Fonesca, Hagen or Hagens, Thomas, and Yanez’s motion for summary judgment. Hawthorne did not oppose Swensen’s motion but opposed the summary-judgment motion.

Swensen’s Motion to Dismiss

Swensen argued that Hawthorne’s claims were untimely, that he had not adequately alleged her personal involvement, that she was protected by qualified immunity, and that the property confiscation was reasonably related to a legitimate prison-safety interest.

The court rejected the timeliness argument. It held that California’s general two-year limitations period for § 1983 personal-injury claims, together with the applicable two-year imprisonment tolling period, generally gave an incarcerated person four years to bring such a claim. The court also held that the medical-negligence limitations period Swensen cited did not apply because Hawthorne alleged retaliation and constitutional violations, not professional negligence. The court found the claims timely because the action was filed on August 25, 2017, and the amended complaint was filed on April 4, 2018, in relation to events in September 2016.

At the pleading stage, the court accepted the amended complaint’s factual allegations as true and did not consider Hawthorne’s deposition testimony. It found that Hawthorne sufficiently alleged that Swensen participated in a mental-health treatment meeting where the team authorized confiscation of his legal materials, religious materials, books, and magazines after officials learned about his draft civil-rights complaint. The court therefore found sufficient allegations of personal participation in First Amendment violations. It denied the qualified-immunity argument at this stage because the complaint adequately alleged constitutional violations and Swensen’s involvement.

The court also declined to treat prison progress notes as establishing the truth of the reason for the confiscation. It held that the amended complaint adequately alleged that the confiscation was unjustified and retaliatory. The court DENIED Swensen’s motion to dismiss and ordered her to file a summary-judgment motion within 60 days.

Request for Judicial Notice

Swensen asked the court to take judicial notice—officially accept certain facts without requiring ordinary proof—of three documents. The court GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART that request. It granted the request as to the existence of one court filing but did not accept the truth of statements in the original complaint or attached exhibits. It denied the request as to two progress-note documents because the accuracy of their contents, including the purpose of the property confiscation, could not be readily determined at that stage.

CDCR Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

The CDCR Defendants argued that Hawthorne had not exhausted the prison’s available grievance process, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, for claims against Fonesca, Davis, Hagens, and Czajkowski and for certain religion and speech claims against Thomas. Exhaustion requires a prisoner to use the available prison grievance process through its required final level before bringing a federal lawsuit about prison conditions.

The court found that the grievance process was available to Hawthorne and that he frequently used it. During the relevant period, he filed 20 custody grievances, six of which were fully exhausted, and eight healthcare grievances that reached the final level. But the court found that none of the grievances identified Fonesca, Davis, Hagens, or Czajkowski or specifically referred to the August 26, 2016 cell search, the September 9, 2016 treatment-team meeting, or Czajkowski’s alleged use of force. One grievance possibly raised an access-to-courts or retaliation claim involving Yanez and Thomas, but it did not notify prison officials of the claims against the other defendants or of the religion and speech claims against Thomas.

The court concluded that Hawthorne had not exhausted the claims at issue and had not produced evidence showing that the grievance process was unavailable to him. It GRANTED the CDCR Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. It granted summary judgment for Fonesca, Davis, Hagens, and Czajkowski on all claims, and for Thomas on the First Amendment religion and speech claims. Fonesca, Davis, Hagens, and Czajkowski were dismissed from the action.

Remaining Claims and Disposition

The remaining claims were: (1) Yanez allegedly discovered and read Hawthorne’s draft federal civil-rights complaint, confiscated it, and reported it to mental-health staff in retaliation; (2) Swensen and Thomas allegedly directed custodial staff to confiscate legal materials and the draft complaint in retaliation; (3) Swensen and Thomas allegedly confiscated religious books and items, violating the right to practice religion; and (4) Swensen and Thomas allegedly confiscated books and magazines, violating the First Amendment right to free speech.

Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. DENIED Swensen’s motion to dismiss and GRANTED the CDCR Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court set a briefing schedule for a later dispositive motion and stated that no hearing would be held on that motion.

The authoritative version

Read the full 20-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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