San Francisco International Arts Festival v. Breed
- James Donato
- 3:20-cv-07314
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 7
San Francisco International Arts Festival v. Breed: Judge Donato dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice after finding their claims inadequately pleaded.
San Francisco International Arts Festival and Nkechi Emeruwa’s claims were dismissed with prejudice; judgment was entered for London Breed and Gavin Newsom.
What happened
In San Francisco International Arts Festival v. Breed, San Francisco International Arts Festival and artist Nkechi Emeruwa challenged restrictions on public gatherings during the COVID-19 pandemic. They said officials denied permits for two outdoor performances while allowing other organizations to hold events elsewhere.
The plaintiffs brought three civil-rights claims against Mayor London Breed and sought a declaration against Breed and Governor Gavin Newsom. They alleged violations involving free expression, equal protection, and due process.
Judge Donato dismissed the entire complaint with prejudice and entered judgment for the defendants. He found that the complaint did not adequately describe the challenged rules, a city policy or practice, or facts supporting the constitutional claims, and he denied another chance to amend.
The detailed version
- San Francisco International Arts Festival v. Breed · No. 3:20-cv-07314
- James Donato
- Mar. 4, 2022
Background
San Francisco International Arts Festival and affiliated artist Nkechi Emeruwa sued San Francisco Mayor London Breed and California Governor Gavin Newsom over limits on public gatherings adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs identified the denial of permits for outdoor performance events at Crane Cove Park in May 2021 and the Jerry Garcia Amphitheater in September 2021 as the main events at issue. They alleged that other organizations were allowed to hold events at other San Francisco locations.
The third amended complaint asserted three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Breed: freedom of expression, equal protection, and due process. Newsom was excluded from those claims. The complaint also asserted a declaratory-relief claim against both Breed and Newsom, although the court found the claim vague.
Declaratory Relief
The court dismissed the declaratory-relief claim because the plaintiffs did not provide a short and clear statement showing they might be entitled to relief, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. The complaint did not say whether any permit applications were currently pending, identify the relevant mayoral or gubernatorial guidelines, or clearly describe the declaration the plaintiffs wanted.
The court concluded that the claim was too vague to give the defendants fair notice or justify judicial intervention. It also characterized the requested declarations about COVID-19 public-gathering rules as concerning speculative situations supported by an inadequate record.
Claims Against Breed
Because Breed was sued in her official capacity, the court treated the claims as claims against the City and County of San Francisco. Under the rule from Monell v. Department of Social Services, a local government generally cannot be held liable under § 1983 for an employee’s acts unless a government policy, custom, or practice caused the alleged injury.
The court held that the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged such a policy, custom, or practice. The complaint described two alleged violations in 2021, but the court said that a single or a few isolated incidents do not establish the policy or practice required for municipal liability. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to rely on a ratification theory because the theory appeared only vaguely in their opposition brief and was not supported by factual allegations in the complaint.
Individual Constitutional Claims
For the First Amendment freedom-of-expression claim, the court found that the complaint did not identify a specific ordinance or permit system that infringed speech. It also did not plausibly allege viewpoint discrimination or show that a speech regulation lacked adequate tailoring or alternative channels of communication.
For the equal-protection claim, the court said the plaintiffs did not identify a group of similarly situated people who received different treatment, or facts showing intentional discrimination. The complaint referred generally to sporting events and other organizations, but did not allege that another group received a permit for an outdoor event at either disputed venue during the same period.
For the due-process claim, the court found the allegations of retaliation and bias vague and conclusory. The plaintiffs did not plausibly allege either a protected liberty or property interest or a denial of adequate procedural protections. The court also said the plaintiffs’ reliance on a case concerning neutral and detached judges did not apply to the circumstances alleged.
Disposition
The court dismissed the third amended complaint in its entirety with prejudice. It explained that this was the plaintiffs’ fourth attempt to state a plausible claim and concluded that another amendment would be futile. The case was dismissed with prejudice, judgment was entered for the defendants, and each side was ordered to bear its own fees and costs.
Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.