Bell v. Williams

Background

The court held a final pretrial conference on March 10, 2022. The case was set for a jury trial beginning March 21, 2022, and all parties were represented by counsel. The order resolved trial-management issues and 13 motions in limine, which are requests to decide before trial whether particular evidence or arguments may be presented to the jury.

Trial procedures

The court ordered:

- An eight-member jury, with four peremptory challenges for each side. - General questioning of prospective jurors by the court, followed by up to 20 minutes of questioning by counsel for each side. - A joint, neutral statement of the case for use during jury questioning, including some explanation of Bell’s pretrial detention. - Amended witness lists by March 15, 2022, coordination concerning witnesses appearing on both lists, and 24 hours’ notice of intended witnesses. - Trial exhibits in binders with numbered tabs and descriptive indexes by March 18, 2022. Confidential exhibits required the court’s permission before introduction; admitted confidential exhibits would be part of the public record, with redactions if necessary. - A five-day trial estimate. Each side received up to 30 minutes for opening statements, eight hours for presenting evidence, and one hour for closing argument. - Jury selection on March 16, 2022, and trial beginning March 21, 2022. The court stated that it did not hold trials on Fridays, although juries could continue deliberating on Fridays. - The parties’ requested bifurcation of punitive damages, meaning that any punitive-damages phase would occur separately if necessary. Each side would have up to 30 minutes for argument during that phase. - Vaccination and masking requirements for jurors, counsel, trial-team members, parties, party representatives, and members of the public. Witnesses and law-enforcement personnel were expected to be vaccinated, and courtroom participants were required to wear masks, subject to the stated exceptions for fully vaccinated witnesses and questioning counsel while at the witness stand.

Administrative exhaustion

The defendants asserted that Bell had not completed the required administrative grievance process for claims alleging that the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act were violated by placing him in a safety cell. The defendants were ordered to lodge all administrative grievances covering the events at issue, and Bell was ordered to file a brief addressing administrative exhaustion of those two claims.

Plaintiff’s motions in limine

1. Bell’s motion seeking permission to appear at trial, including jury selection, without restraints; to access personal grooming tools; and to have custodial staff place or remove restraints outside the jury’s presence was denied as to access to personal grooming tools and granted as to the balance of the motion. Bell’s counsel was ordered to provide his clothing to the United States Marshal. If Bell became disruptive or another reason for shackling arose, the court would require his non-writing hand to be shackled to his waist outside the jury’s presence.

2. Bell’s motion to bar unpleaded affirmative defenses was denied as moot. The defendants stated that they would not assert the defenses of fundamental alteration or direct threat. They instead stated that they would argue that Bell could not show a reasonable accommodation or that Sergeant Williams’s decisions were unreasonable, which the defendants characterized as defenses to Bell’s initial showing on his claims.

3. Bell’s motion to prevent the defendants from calling witnesses not included in their initial disclosures was denied as to Captain Kevin McConnell because Bell conceded that he was not prejudiced after deposing McConnell. The motion was also denied as to the San Francisco General Hospital Custodian of Records, who would be called solely to authenticate Bell’s medical records. The available opinion text is incomplete at this point and does not clearly show the full disposition concerning Deputy Ruiz and Nurse DeGuzman; it states that defendants could call those witnesses for impeachment purposes and that counsel would try to reach a stipulation concerning the authenticity and possibly admissibility of the medical records.

4. Bell’s motion to exclude the defendants’ expert from testifying about ultimate issues or information lacking an evidentiary foundation was granted as framed. Experts could not offer legal conclusions or rely on hypothetical facts lacking a foundation in the evidence. The court did not exclude particular testimony at that time, leaving Bell free to raise specific objections at trial.

5. Bell’s motion to exclude prejudicial evidence of convictions and other bad acts was granted as to Bell’s juvenile record; denied as to the 2012 arrest charges for which Bell was then detained; denied as to requests for discipline for contraband to the extent those matters were relevant to Sergeant Williams’s knowledge and Bell’s prior experiences in the safety cell; and granted as to Bell’s 2001, 2011, and 2012 convictions. The court found those convictions more than 10 years old and found that the defendants had not shown that their probative value substantially outweighed their prejudicial effect. The parties were ordered to prepare a neutral statement of the 2012 charges for witnesses who testified about them.

Defendants’ motions in limine

1. The defendants’ motion to exclude or limit the opinion testimony of Bell’s expert, Stephen Sinclair, was denied without prejudice to specific objections at trial. The court stated that Sinclair’s work in the Washington correctional system, rather than California, concerned the weight of his testimony rather than its admissibility. If Bell laid a proper foundation, Sinclair could testify about best practices for cell extractions, use of the safety cell, and review of surveillance video. The court also found that the opinions in Sinclair’s amended report were not new opinions but added details closely related to matters in his earlier report.

2. The defendants’ motion to exclude evidence or argument that the S.O.R.T. cell-extraction and safety-cell policies were facially unconstitutional was granted as framed. Bell stated that he was not making that facial challenge. The court allowed him to present evidence and argue that the policies were violated, and to argue that the policies’ failure to specifically address prisoners with disabilities, as it related to deputy training, caused constitutional violations.

3. The defendants’ motion concerning evidence or argument about other alleged safety-cell misuse was granted as to a news article; denied as to Bell’s own safety-cell experiences; granted as to four summary-judgment declarants because they were not on Bell’s witness list and the issue appeared moot; and denied as to safety-cell data, provided Bell laid a foundation, showed relevance, and presented a sponsoring witness.

4. The defendants’ motion to exclude evidence or argument that cell extractions are inherently violent was denied without prejudice to specific objections at trial.

5. The defendants’ motion to exclude evidence about other claims, complaints, allegations, investigations, discipline, or lawsuits involving the defendants and their witnesses for excessive force or other misconduct was denied to the extent the evidence was relevant to Bell’s claim against a local government based on failure to train deputies about S.O.R.T. cell extraction or placing prisoners with disabilities in safety cells, and denied to the extent the evidence was used for impeachment. Bell was required to obtain the court’s permission before seeking to introduce such evidence. The court stated that one specific example discussed at the hearing did not appear relevant and would not be admitted.

6. The defendants’ motion to exclude argument or evidence about “missing” evidence was granted as framed. Witnesses could not testify about missing surveillance footage. If Bell wanted to introduce evidence about surveillance cameras at the jail, he first had to make an offer of proof outside the jury’s presence.

7. The defendants’ motion to exclude lay-opinion testimony about San Francisco Sheriff’s Office practices or medical evidence was granted as to Bell’s opinion testimony about medical causation. Bell could testify about what he experienced concerning his injuries and what accommodation he believed he needed for his disability, but he could not testify about medical causation.

8. The defendants’ motion to exclude argument or evidence about issues already decided on summary judgment or never alleged was denied without prejudice to specific objections at trial. The court stated that evidence related to claims dismissed on summary judgment could still be relevant to Bell’s remaining claims or provide factual context. Bell could not testify about Deputy Leung’s intent in issuing the RFD and had to limit his testimony to describing events that occurred.

Disposition and classification

Judge Susan Illston entered the final pretrial order and resolved the listed trial-management matters and motions in limine using the dispositions described above. This order prepared the case for trial and did not decide the merits of the remaining claims. It is therefore classified as a procedural order.