Doe v. City Of Concord

Background

After the court dismissed Doe's first amended complaint while allowing an amendment, Doe filed a second amended complaint. She sued the City of Concord, the City of Cotati, the County of Contra Costa, the County of Sonoma, and individuals in the Concord Police Department, Cotati Police Department, Contra Costa County District Attorney's Office, and Sonoma County District Attorney's Office. The defendants moved to dismiss the second amended complaint.

Doe's first claim alleged that defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that permits claims against state or local officials for certain constitutional violations. She alleged that her rape case was not pursued because it was six years old, while other cases—including cases involving older crimes or male victims—were prosecuted. She also asserted a "class of one" theory, meaning that she claimed she was intentionally treated differently from similarly situated people without a rational basis. Counts two through four asserted a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and municipal-liability claims. Counts five through nine were state-law claims.

Reasoning

The court held that the second amended complaint did not plausibly allege an equal-protection violation. For a § 1983 equal-protection claim, the court explained, a plaintiff must allege intentional discrimination based on membership in a protected class and identify similarly situated people who were treated differently. The court found that Doe's comparisons among rape victims, victims of other crimes, male rape victims, and victims in older cases did not identify a legally sufficient comparison group or show the required discriminatory intent.

The court also rejected Doe's class-of-one theory. It explained that such a theory depends on a clear standard for measuring departures from ordinary treatment. The court found no such standard here because decisions about investigating and pursuing individual criminal cases involve discretionary judgments based on many individualized factors. The court therefore found that Doe had not stated a cognizable equal-protection claim, while recognizing that her allegations of rape were serious and troubling.

Because Doe had not stated a viable § 1983 claim, the court dismissed the § 1985 conspiracy claim and the municipal-liability claims. After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the court's authority to hear related state-law claims—in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Disposition

Judge James Donato dismissed the second amended complaint in its entirety. Counts one through four were dismissed with prejudice. Counts five through nine, the state-law claims, were dismissed without prejudice. The court declined to give Doe another opportunity to amend, stating that she had already had three opportunities to present a plausible claim and had not requested another amendment. The case was closed.