Harrington v. Saul

Background

Steven Harrington sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying his disability-benefits claim. He alleged disability based on chronic lower-back pain and related conditions. The administrative law judge found that Harrington had severe impairments, including moderate lumbar spondylosis, nerve impingement, degenerative disc disease with multiple disc bulges, spondylosis with radiculopathy, and intervertebral disc disorders with radiculopathy.

The administrative law judge determined that Harrington had the residual functional capacity—the most he could still do in a work setting despite his limitations—to perform light work. The judge found that he could stand or walk for 30 minutes at a time, for a total of six hours in an eight-hour workday, and sit for 45 minutes at a time, also for a total of six hours. He would need to alternate positions after those activities. Based on vocational-expert testimony, the administrative law judge concluded that Harrington could perform his past work as a labor consultant.

Harrington moved for summary judgment, asking the court to reverse the decision or remand the case. He argued that the administrative law judge improperly discounted his testimony about the severity and frequency of his symptoms and incorrectly determined that he could perform his past work. The defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the administrative law judge’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and contained no reversible error.

Analysis

The court held that the administrative law judge did not provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting Harrington’s testimony. The administrative law judge relied on Harrington’s reported 50-percent improvement after injections, but the court explained that partial improvement did not contradict testimony that he still experienced pain when sitting or standing for extended periods. The administrative law judge also relied on Harrington’s use of over-the-counter or no pain medication, but Harrington reported that prescription medication made it harder for him to function. The court concluded that his decision not to take prescription medication was not inconsistent with his testimony about his limitations.

The court also rejected reliance on Harrington’s ability to walk without assistance and sit during the administrative hearing. Harrington testified that he could sit for up to 40 minutes before losing concentration, and the administrative law judge did not ask whether he was in pain or had lost concentration during the hearing. The court further found that the administrative law judge incorrectly stated that the record showed no objective evidence of severe stenosis or nerve-root impairment. Because that incorrect reading of the medical evidence influenced the assessment of Harrington’s limitations and residual functional capacity, the error was not harmless.

The court also found that the vocational expert’s testimony did not provide substantial evidence supporting the decision. The administrative law judge’s residual functional capacity did not include Harrington’s claimed need to take frequent breaks or spend equal or greater time recovering after sitting for 20 to 40 minutes. The court therefore concluded that the hypothetical given to the vocational expert did not include all of Harrington’s limitations.

Finally, the court found that the vocational expert relied on the wrong job description. The expert used the Dictionary of Occupational Titles description for a “Human Resource Advisor,” a position involving workplace interpersonal problems, while Harrington described his prior work as involving project assessments, onsite supervision, and occasional physical labor. The court stated that the administrative law judge and vocational expert needed to reassess whether Harrington’s prior work had an equivalent job description or was a composite job involving significant elements of two or more occupations.

Disposition

The court remanded the action to the assigned administrative law judge for further proceedings. Harrington’s motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. The defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment was denied. The order adjudicated all pending motions and closed the case.