F. v. Saul

Background

Florida F. sought judicial review of an administrative law judge’s decision denying her application for disability-insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council declined to review that decision, making it the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of court review. Both parties consented to a magistrate judge’s jurisdiction and filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

Florida F. alleged an onset date of August 19, 2013. The administrative law judge found that she was not disabled between that date and September 30, 2013, the date on which she last met the Act’s insured-status requirements. The judge found severe impairments involving a neurocognitive disorder, a spine disorder, and carpal tunnel syndrome. The judge determined that she could perform a limited range of light work and could return to past work as a financial accounting officer, program analyst, or budget consultant.

Arguments and Evidence

Florida F. argued that the administrative law judge failed to discuss or mention two impairments and improperly evaluated her testimony and the opinions of treating and reviewing doctors. Saul argued that the judge committed no error and that the findings were supported by substantial evidence.

The opinion describes extensive evidence of persistent pain, hand and arm problems, neurological conditions, spinal disorders, balance and mobility problems, cognitive difficulties, and medication side effects. Florida F. testified that she could use a computer for only about twenty minutes before needing a break, could not effectively use her hands, had difficulty walking and maintaining attention, and needed help with daily activities. A vocational expert testified that a person who was off-task 15 percent of the time could not maintain employment.

Court’s Analysis

The court found that the administrative law judge rejected Florida F.’s testimony with generalized language stating that her statements were not entirely consistent with the evidence. The judge did not identify which parts of her testimony were inconsistent with which evidence. The court held that this explanation did not meet the requirement for specific, clear, and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence. It therefore credited Florida F.’s testimony as true as a matter of law.

The court also found that the administrative law judge improperly discounted the medical evidence by relying on isolated observations, including occasional findings that Florida F.’s gait, muscle bulk, and tone were normal, as well as observations about her nutrition, lungs, cardiovascular rhythm, and brain imaging. The court concluded that many of these observations were irrelevant to the impairments at issue and that the judge’s rejection of the medical evidence and resulting residual-functional-capacity finding were unsupported by substantial evidence. The court also rejected Saul’s argument that newer agency regulations had eliminated the Ninth Circuit’s requirement that an administrative law judge provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting contradicted medical opinions.

Remedy and Disposition

The court applied the rule requiring evidence to be credited as true when the administrative law judge gave legally insufficient reasons for rejecting it, no unresolved issues required further proceedings, and the record showed that the claimant would have to be found disabled if the evidence were credited. The court concluded that those conditions were met. It found that Florida F. had been disabled since the alleged onset date, that further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose, and that the credited evidence showed no residual capacity to function in the workplace.

Judge Robert M. Illman granted Florida F.’s motion for summary judgment and denied Saul’s cross-motion. The court reversed the administrative law judge’s finding of non-disability and remanded the case for the immediate calculation and award of benefits.