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N.D. Cal.Procedural orderFiled Mar. 24, 2022

Ramirez v. City Of San Jose

Judge
Virginia Demarchi
Docket
5:21-cv-08127
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
18
Civil RightsSection 1983Motion to DismissCivil Procedure
In one sentence

Ramirez v. City Of San Jose: Judge Demarchi granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, allowing Ramirez to amend most claims.

Who this affects

Nicholas Ramirez’s claims against the City of San Jose and officers Steve Mendez, Dejon Packer, Gerardo Silva, and Ali Miri were dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6); Ramirez was allowed to amend most claims, but not the § 1981 unequal-punishment theory.

What happened

In Ramirez v. City Of San Jose, Nicholas Ramirez alleged that San Jose police officers unlawfully stopped, searched, detained, and used excessive force against him, discriminated against him, and violated federal and California law. He sued the officers and the City of San Jose.

The court found that Ramirez’s complaint did not clearly identify what each officer did or provide enough facts supporting his discrimination, unreasonable-search, excessive-force, municipal-policy, statutory, and state-law claims. The court said his excessive-force allegations were potentially sufficient in one respect, but were unclear about which officer used which force. The court dismissed his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 with permission to amend part of it, but not the portion based on unequal punishment.

Judge Demarchi granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the first amended complaint with leave to amend. The court did not decide whether the officers were protected by qualified immunity and allowed Ramirez to file an amended complaint by April 14, 2022.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Ramirez v. City Of San Jose · No. 5:21-cv-08127
Judge
Virginia Demarchi
Date
Mar. 24, 2022

Background

Nicholas Ramirez sued the City of San Jose and officers Steve Mendez, Dejon Packer, Gerardo Silva, and Ali Miri. He alleged that Officer Mendez stopped him while he was driving, asked him to leave his vehicle, questioned him about drugs, weapons, his criminal history, and gang affiliation, and attempted to photograph his tattoos. Ramirez alleged that Mendez forced his hands behind his back, causing significant pain and aggravating a preexisting injury. He also alleged that officers discriminated against him based on race and perceived national origin and that Officer Miri made comments about his clothing and the presence of Norteños in the area.

Ramirez’s first amended complaint asserted federal claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The § 1983 claims alleged equal-protection, unreasonable-search-and-seizure, excessive-force, and municipal-liability violations. A municipal-liability claim, sometimes called a Monell claim, seeks to hold a local government responsible for an unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom. Ramirez also asserted claims under California Government Code sections 11135 and 11139, the California Constitution, the Bane Act, the Ralph Act, and California tort law.

Legal standard

The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion but explained that conclusory statements and unsupported legal conclusions were insufficient. The defendants also asserted qualified immunity, a protection that can shield government officials from civil liability unless their conduct violated a clearly established legal right.

Federal claims

The court held that Ramirez failed to state an equal-protection claim against the individual defendants. The complaint did not clearly identify the conduct forming the basis of the claim or explain what each officer did. It also did not plausibly allege that the officers stopped or detained Ramirez because of his race or perceived national origin. The court noted that Ramirez acknowledged the officers said they stopped him because he appeared to be looking down, possibly at a cellphone, while driving, and he did not allege that he was not doing so.

The court held that Ramirez failed to state a Fourth Amendment unreasonable-search-or-seizure claim. The complaint did not clearly identify each officer’s conduct, and the allegation that Ramirez was detained without reasonable suspicion was conclusory. The court stated that the alleged reason for the stop—looking down while driving—could support reasonable suspicion of misconduct.

The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the alleged force was necessarily too minor to support an excessive-force claim. It recognized that significant injury is not required and that excessively tight handcuffing can support such a claim. However, the court dismissed the claim because the complaint did not clearly identify which defendants used what force. The allegations that Mendez forced Ramirez’s hands behind his back and that another officer, possibly Silva, had a grip that should have been loosened were potentially inconsistent and did not give each defendant fair notice of the claim.

The court dismissed Ramirez’s municipal-liability claim against the City. Although the complaint cited lawsuits, studies, data, news reports, and statements concerning alleged racial disparities and police misconduct, the court concluded that Ramirez had not plausibly alleged a constitutional deprivation or an unconstitutional City policy, practice, or custom that motivated the individual officers’ conduct. The court did not characterize the allegations as merely formulaic or conclusory.

The court dismissed Ramirez’s Title VI claim against the City because he did not plausibly allege intentional discrimination based on race or perceived national origin. The court also dismissed the § 1981 claim. It held that Ramirez could not proceed under the statute’s protection against unequal punishment because he was not punished, cited, or charged. The court stated that excessive force or unlawful detention could potentially support a § 1981 claim based on equal benefit of laws and proceedings, but Ramirez had not plausibly alleged that the officers acted because of his race or perceived national origin. The court dismissed the § 1981 claim with leave to amend as to the equal-benefit theory and without leave to amend as to the unequal-punishment theory.

State claims

The court dismissed the claims under California Government Code sections 11135 and 11139 because Ramirez had not adequately alleged discrimination because of race. It dismissed his California constitutional due-process and equal-protection claim because the complaint did not clearly identify the deprivation caused by each defendant. It dismissed his California constitutional unreasonable-search-and-seizure claim for the same reasons it dismissed the federal unreasonable-search-and-seizure claim.

The court dismissed the Bane Act claim because Ramirez had not plausibly alleged threats, intimidation, coercion, or a specific intent to violate his rights. It dismissed the Ralph Act claim because he did not allege that a defendant committed or threatened violence against him or that the conduct was motivated by a protected characteristic. It dismissed the battery claim because Ramirez had not plausibly alleged that an individual defendant touched him with intent to harm or offend him; the related claim against the City therefore also failed. Finally, the court dismissed the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim because Ramirez had not adequately alleged an intent to cause emotional distress or severe or extreme emotional distress; the related vicarious-liability claim against the City also failed.

Disposition

Judge Demarchi granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the first amended complaint with leave to amend. The court permitted Ramirez to file an amended complaint addressing the identified deficiencies by April 14, 2022. The court declined at that time to decide whether the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the complaint’s unclear allegations made it difficult to identify the precise factual bases of the claims.

The authoritative version

Read the full 18-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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