David M. v. Kijakazi
- Robert Illman
- 1:20-cv-06747
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 5
In David M. v. Kijakazi, Judge Illman granted David M.’s summary-judgment motion, denied Kijakazi’s remand motion, and ordered benefits paid.
David M., whose application for disability insurance benefits was at issue, was determined to be disabled under Medical-Vocational Guideline 202.00(c) and became eligible for benefits beginning after August 1, 2018. The Social Security Administration was directed to pay those benefits.
What happened
David M. applied for disability insurance benefits after suffering a stroke and developing other physical and mental impairments. An administrative law judge found that he could perform light work and was not disabled.
The parties disputed how to apply Social Security Medical-Vocational Guideline 202.00(c). David M. argued that the rule considers whether his skills transfer to a significant range of skilled or semi-skilled jobs; Kijakazi argued that unskilled jobs and individual skills also counted.
Judge Robert M. Illman ruled that unskilled jobs did not count under the guideline and that David M.’s skills transferred to only one skilled job. The judge granted David M.’s summary-judgment motion, denied Kijakazi’s remand motion, and remanded the case with instructions to pay benefits beginning August 1, 2018.
The detailed version
- David M. v. Kijakazi · No. 1:20-cv-06747
- Robert Illman
- Mar. 25, 2022
Background
David M. applied for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. He alleged that his disability began on August 1, 2018. After administrative proceedings, an administrative law judge (ALJ) denied the application. The Appeals Council denied further review, and David M. sought review in the district court.
The ALJ found that David M. had suffered a stroke and had diabetes with neuropathy. The ALJ determined that he could perform light work, subject to restrictions including no workplace hazards, no repetitive forward bending, and no driving. The ALJ also found that he could not return to his past work as a contractor but had transferable skills allowing him to perform the skilled occupation of estimator. Based on those findings, the ALJ concluded that he was not disabled.
The parties’ motions
David M. moved for summary judgment, asking the court to remand the case with instructions for the immediate payment of benefits. Kijakazi filed a competing motion for remand, seeking further administrative development of the record. The opinion states that both parties consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge.
The dispute centered on Medical-Vocational Guideline 202.00(c), which applies to a person of advanced age who is limited to light work, cannot perform past relevant work, and has either unskilled work experience or skills that are not readily transferable to a significant range of semi-skilled or skilled work within the person’s functional capacity.
Court’s analysis
The court held that the plain text of Guideline 202.00(c) addresses skilled and semi-skilled work, not unskilled work. It therefore rejected Kijakazi’s argument that David M.’s ability to perform unskilled occupations—such as ticket seller, routing clerk, and collator operator—prevented a finding of disability under the guideline.
The court also rejected Kijakazi’s argument that the individual skills making up the occupation of estimator could be treated as separate occupations. Applying the uncontested factual findings, the court determined that David M. met the guideline’s requirements: he was limited to light work, was over age 55, could not perform his past work, and had transferable skills leading to only one skilled occupation, estimator. The court stated that one occupation does not constitute a significant range of work.
Ruling and effect
The court concluded that Guideline 202.00(c) required a determination that David M. was disabled and eligible for disability insurance benefits as a matter of law. It found that the record was fully developed and that further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose.
The court granted David M.’s motion for summary judgment and denied Kijakazi’s motion for remand. It remanded the case with instructions for the payment of benefits for the period after David M.’s alleged onset date of August 1, 2018.
Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.