R.K.T. v. Saul

Background

R.K.T. challenged the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision finding that she was disabled and entitled to benefits beginning November 11, 2015, rather than beginning on her alleged onset date of November 14, 2013. R.K.T. moved for summary judgment and asked the court to order an immediate award of benefits under the Ninth Circuit’s credit-as-true rule. The Commissioner moved to remand for further administrative proceedings and conceded some errors in the administrative decision.

In the first administrative proceedings, an administrative law judge, or ALJ, found that R.K.T. was not disabled. In an earlier judicial review, Judge Beth Labson Freeman held that the ALJ had not provided adequate reasons for rejecting R.K.T.’s testimony about being unable to sit for more than 35 minutes at a time. Judge Freeman remanded for further administrative proceedings but upheld the ALJ’s treatment of the opinions of Dr. Galina Balon and Dr. Patti Allen.

After remand, ALJ Ruxana Meyer found that R.K.T. had several severe impairments and could not perform her past relevant work. The ALJ nevertheless found that R.K.T. could perform other jobs before November 11, 2015, and was disabled beginning on that date. R.K.T. challenged the ALJ’s treatment of the doctors’ opinions, her own testimony, and the vocational expert’s testimony about available jobs.

Court’s analysis

The court applied the law-of-the-case doctrine, which generally prevents reconsideration of an issue already decided by the same court or a higher court in the same case. It held that Judge Freeman had already decided that the reasons for giving little weight to Dr. Balon’s and Dr. Allen’s opinions were legally sufficient and supported by substantial evidence. The court found that the opinions, the relevant evidence, and the ALJ’s reasoning were substantially similar in the two proceedings. It also found that none of the recognized exceptions to the doctrine applied. Therefore, those medical opinions did not provide a basis for ordering an immediate award of benefits.

The Commissioner conceded that the ALJ had failed to resolve an apparent conflict between the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and the vocational expert’s testimony. The ALJ had assessed a limitation to routine one- to two-step assignments, while the vocational expert identified jobs with reasoning-level requirements that could conflict with that limitation. The court held that this error should be addressed on remand and could not support an immediate award of benefits under the credit-as-true rule.

The Commissioner also conceded that the ALJ had failed to adequately explain the evaluation of R.K.T.’s testimony. The court declined to treat that testimony as conclusively establishing disability. For example, R.K.T.’s testimony that she took one nap each day did not establish that she needed one or two unscheduled naps per day, which was the limitation the vocational expert testified would prevent employment. The court also found that testimony from 2020 did not necessarily establish R.K.T.’s limitations during the 2013-to-2015 period at issue. Because R.K.T. had not shown that crediting the disputed testimony would require a finding of disability, the credit-as-true rule did not apply.

Ruling

Judge Joseph C. Spero granted the Commissioner’s motion to remand. He granted R.K.T.’s motion for summary judgment to the extent it sought remand for further proceedings and denied it to the extent it sought an instruction to award benefits. The court remanded the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with the order and Judge Freeman’s earlier order, directed the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of R.K.T., and closed the case.