Lindow v. Conservatorship of Carl E. Lindow

Background

Robert O Lindow represented himself in this case. He had been designated a vexatious litigant in California state court in February 2021. That designation required him to obtain court permission before filing new litigation. The state court’s designation was based on his repeated filings concerning the Aptos property and an auction of personal property connected with his estranged brother Carl E. Lindow’s conservatorship proceedings.

Lindow sued Chief Justice Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye and the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara, as the state defendants. He also sued Darren Wallace, Rebecca Weisman, Bonnie Ross, and Messner Reeves LLP as the individual defendants.

Claims and Legal Standards

Lindow’s third cause of action challenged California’s vexatious-litigant statutes under the due-process protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. He argued that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague because they did not give adequate notice or sufficient guidance to judges, and that they were overly broad. He asserted both facial and as-applied challenges. His sixth cause of action sought declaratory and injunctive relief based on the third cause of action.

Lindow also asserted a federal civil-rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for abuse of process against the individual defendants. A § 1983 claim requires the defendant to have deprived the plaintiff of a federal right while acting under state authority. Lindow additionally asserted state-law claims for common-law abuse of process, elder financial abuse, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(1) concerns whether the court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Rule 12(b)(6) concerns whether the complaint states a legally viable claim supported by sufficient factual allegations.

Court’s Analysis

The court held that Ninth Circuit precedent, particularly Wolfe v. George, foreclosed Lindow’s vagueness and overbreadth challenges. Under that precedent, California’s vexatious-litigant statute gives fair notice, is not unconstitutionally overbroad, and is rationally related to legitimate purposes, including protecting courts and litigants from repetitive or harassing litigation. The court therefore granted the state defendants’ motion to dismiss Lindow’s third and sixth causes of action.

The court dismissed Lindow’s § 1983 abuse-of-process claim against the individual defendants. It held that Wallace’s appointment as a conservator did not make him a state actor; conservators performing their court-appointed statutory duties act in a quasi-judicial capacity. The court also held that the attorney defendants were private parties and did not act under state authority merely because they represented clients in court proceedings.

Because the court dismissed all claims over which it had original federal jurisdiction, it declined supplemental jurisdiction over Lindow’s remaining state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The opinion states that the court dismissed those state-law claims on that basis.

Disposition

The court granted the motions to dismiss. It found that amendment would be futile because Ninth Circuit precedent foreclosed Lindow’s due-process argument and, in the court’s view, he could not show that the individual defendants acted as state actors for § 1983 purposes. The court ordered judgment on the second, third, and sixth causes of action and instructed the clerk to close the file. The opinion does not specify that the dismissals were with or without prejudice.