Wescott v. Beresford Corporation

Background

Carl A. Wescott, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Calvin DOE, Tricia Lo, the Beresford Arms Hotel, and Beresford Corporation. He based the lawsuit on events during an October 2021 stay at the hotel. Wescott alleged that he raised safety concerns with Calvin DOE, who twice called police to harass him. According to the complaint, police searched Wescott’s hotel room and belongings without a warrant or consent and eventually removed him from the hotel. Wescott alleged that belongings left in the room were lost, taken, or discarded, and that he suffered mental anguish.

Wescott asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the California Bane Act, the California Constitution, and California common law. The common-law claims included conversion, larceny, negligence, negligent retention or supervision, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy.

Screening Standard and Jurisdiction

Because Wescott had been allowed to proceed without paying the filing fee, the court was required to screen the complaint before service. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court had to dismiss claims that were frivolous, failed to state a legally sufficient claim, or sought relief from an immune defendant. The court applied a standard similar to the one used for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and construed Wescott’s allegations liberally, while declining to add facts not pleaded.

The court held that federal-question jurisdiction existed at that stage because the complaint asserted claims under federal law through § 1983.

Civil-Rights Claims

The court dismissed Wescott’s § 1983 illegal-search claim as pleaded. Section 1983 requires a constitutional or federal-rights violation committed by someone acting under state law. The defendants named in the complaint were private parties, and Wescott did not allege facts plausibly showing that they conspired or jointly acted with the responding police officers. He also did not name any police officer or government entity as a defendant. The court gave Wescott leave to amend the portion of this claim based on federal constitutional violations.

The court likewise found that Wescott’s § 1983 due-process claim failed because he did not plausibly allege that the private defendants conspired with law enforcement. The court gave him leave to amend the federal constitutional portion of that claim.

The court rejected Wescott’s claims for damages directly under Article I, sections 7 and 13 of the California Constitution because, as pleaded, those provisions did not provide a private damages action and Wescott had other available causes of action. The court dismissed the § 1983 claims based on California constitutional violations without leave to amend.

Wescott’s Bane Act claim had two theories. The court dismissed the theory based on an allegedly unreasonable search because the complaint did not plausibly show that the private defendants were state actors or conspired with law enforcement. The court gave leave to amend that theory. The court allowed the Bane Act theory based on interference with Wescott’s right to remain in and quietly enjoy his hotel room to proceed. Wescott alleged that Calvin DOE provided a false police report, called police, and helped cause Wescott’s expulsion even though Wescott had paid for the room and, according to the complaint, had not damaged property or prompted guest complaints. The court concluded that these allegations were sufficient at the screening stage to plead coercion.

Common-Law Claims

The conversion claim survived screening. Wescott alleged that he had a right to possess clothing, toiletries, medication, books, and newspapers; that defendants intentionally dispossessed him by forcing him out of the hotel and taking or discarding the items; and that he suffered financial harm replacing them. The court noted that a California statute might impose a 90-day filing period for conversion claims involving property left at a hotel, but treated that time limit as an affirmative defense that did not have to be pleaded at this stage.

The court dismissed the larceny claim without leave to amend. It explained that larceny is a criminal offense under California law, not a common-law civil claim, and that the complaint did not identify a private civil cause of action based on larceny.

The negligence claim survived only as to the alleged failure to inventory Wescott’s belongings left in the hotel. The court found that a hotel may continue to have responsibility for a reasonable time after a guest leaves property behind. The negligence theory based on failure to protect Wescott from Calvin DOE’s alleged harassment was treated as part of the negligent-retention or supervision issue.

The court dismissed the negligent-retention or supervision claim with leave to amend. Wescott’s allegation that defendants knew or should have known that Calvin DOE or other employees posed an unreasonable risk was conclusory. His allegations concerning Tricia Lo’s role and the hotel’s policies were also unclear and did not provide the required short and plain statement of the claim.

The court dismissed the negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim without leave to amend because California treats that theory as negligence rather than as an independent tort, and Wescott’s negligence claim covered the same grounds.

The intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim survived as to allegations that Calvin DOE fabricated evidence and acted recklessly to have Wescott arrested or expelled. However, Wescott alleged only in conclusory terms that he suffered emotional distress and did not adequately allege severe or extreme emotional distress. The court therefore dismissed this claim with leave to amend.

The invasion-of-privacy claim based on intrusion into seclusion survived. The court found that a hotel guest may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a paid-for room during an ongoing stay, and Wescott alleged that defendants called police and provided access to his room. The separate theory based on public disclosure of private facts failed because Wescott did not allege that any private facts had actually been publicized. The court dismissed that theory with leave to amend.

Disposition

The complaint complied with the screening requirements only in part. The claims allowed to proceed were the Bane Act theory concerning interference with Wescott’s right to remain in his hotel room, conversion, negligence concerning property left behind, and invasion of privacy by intrusion. The court dismissed with leave to amend the § 1983 claims based on federal constitutional violations, the Bane Act theory based on the Fourth Amendment, negligent retention or supervision, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy based on public disclosure of private facts. It dismissed without leave to amend the § 1983 claims based on the California Constitution, larceny, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Wescott could file an amended complaint by May 6, 2022. The court stated that, if he did not file one, it would order service of the complaint based on the claims that had not been dismissed.