Cisneros v. Robertson
- Haywood Gilliam
- 4:20-cv-07861
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 11
In Cisneros v. Robertson, Judge Gilliam denied Cisneros’s post-judgment motions and left the habeas case closed.
Miguel A. Cisneros’s federal habeas petition remains dismissed as procedurally defaulted, judgment remains in favor of Jim Robertson, and the case remains closed.
What happened
Miguel A. Cisneros, representing himself, filed a federal petition challenging his conviction. The court had previously dismissed the petition as procedurally defaulted, meaning state procedural rules prevented federal review, and entered judgment for Jim Robertson.
Cisneros filed four motions asking the court to reconsider the dismissal, set aside the judgment, and hold an evidentiary hearing. He argued, among other things, that he was actually innocent, had disabilities affecting his ability to understand legal procedures, and had meritorious claims.
The court denied all four motions because Cisneros did not show clear error, manifest injustice, cause and prejudice, or the new reliable evidence needed to overcome the procedural default. Judge Gilliam stated that the case remains closed and that the 30-day appeal period runs from the date of this order.
The detailed version
- Cisneros v. Robertson · No. 4:20-cv-07861
- Haywood Gilliam
- Apr. 11, 2022
Background
Miguel A. Cisneros, an incarcerated petitioner proceeding without a lawyer, filed a petition for federal review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petition raised three claims: that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of a prior uncharged robbery; that there was insufficient evidence to support a kidnapping conviction arising from a carjacking; and that the trial court improperly instructed the jury under California jury instruction CALCRIM 376.
On February 9, 2022, the court denied Respondent Jim Robertson’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely but granted the motion to dismiss the petition as procedurally defaulted. A procedural default occurs when a state court’s adequate and independent state procedural rule prevents federal review of a claim. The court also denied a certificate of appealability and entered judgment for Robertson. The prior order concluded that the California Supreme Court had applied the Dixon and Lindley procedural bars to Cisneros’s claims. The Dixon bar generally applies to claims that could have been raised on appeal but were not; the Lindley bar applies to claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.
Post-Judgment Motions
Cisneros filed four post-judgment motions, docketed as Nos. 34 through 37. They sought reconsideration or alteration of the judgment, relief from the judgment, an evidentiary hearing, and an order requiring counsel for Robertson to explain why the dismissal should not be vacated. The motions argued that dismissal caused a miscarriage of justice, that Cisneros was actually innocent, that he had disabilities affecting his understanding of legal procedures, that his claims were meritorious, and that trial or instructional errors justified relief.
The court treated the requests under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which permits a court to alter or amend a judgment, and Rule 60(b)(6), which permits relief from a final judgment in extraordinary circumstances when necessary to prevent manifest injustice. The court explained that reconsideration generally requires newly discovered evidence, clear error, or an intervening change in controlling law, and that Rule 60(b)(6) relief is granted sparingly.
Analysis
The court found that most of Cisneros’s arguments did not address the reason for dismissal: procedural default. The court also stated that it could not reconsider whether the California courts correctly applied the Dixon or Lindley bars. For purposes of the federal habeas analysis, the relevant question was whether the state court’s decision rested on a state-law ground independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.
The court rejected Cisneros’s arguments that the alleged exceptions to the Waltreus bar applied because the court had not relied on the Waltreus bar. It also rejected arguments based on his impairment or disability, the state’s opportunity to respond, his need to pursue state-court remedies, and his lack of understanding about where or when to file. The court explained that his claims were procedurally defaulted because he failed to comply with the Dixon and Lindley bars, not because he was required to exhaust state remedies. It added that failing to file in state court would have resulted in denial for failure to exhaust instead.
A petitioner may overcome procedural default by showing cause for the default and actual prejudice from the alleged constitutional error. The court found that Cisneros had not shown that an external factor prevented him or his counsel from raising the claims on direct appeal. It also found that he could not rely on ineffective assistance by appellate counsel as cause because he had not presented that ineffective-assistance claim independently to the state courts. The court further stated that inability to understand the law could not serve as cause in these circumstances.
The court also considered the miscarriage-of-justice exception, which can permit review when a petitioner presents new reliable evidence showing that he is probably actually innocent. The court found that Cisneros had not presented new reliable evidence that was unavailable at trial. His arguments about instructional error, insufficient kidnapping evidence, and a later change in the legal classification of his crimes did not satisfy that requirement. The court also stated that it was unclear what legal change Cisneros meant and that any such change would not affect his conviction unless it applied retroactively.
Disposition
The court denied Cisneros’s motion under Rule 59(e) to reconsider, alter, or amend the judgment. It also denied relief under Rule 60(b)(6), finding no newly discovered evidence, clear error, intervening change in law, or manifest injustice. The court denied all four post-judgment motions, terminated docket entries 34 through 37, and stated that the case remains closed.
The court addressed two later letters asking whether the motions had been decided and whether waiting for the order would affect Cisneros’s ability to appeal. It stated that the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal runs from the date of this order.
Read the full 11-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.