Borges v. County of Mendocino

Background

Ann Marie Borges and Chris Gurr alleged that Mendocino County violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment through two actions: denying their application for a permit to cultivate medical cannabis and designating their neighborhood as a cannabis-prohibition district. They brought a “class of one” claim, which alleges that government officials intentionally treated a person differently from similarly situated people without a rational basis.

The County’s Medical Cannabis Cultivation Ordinance created three permitting phases. Phase One was intended to bring existing growers into the legal market before allowing new entrants. Applicants seeking to relocate cultivation under section 10A.17.080(B)(3) first had to satisfy the proof-of-prior-cultivation requirements in section 10A.17.080(B)(1). Those requirements called for evidence of cultivation before January 1, 2016, and evidence of current cultivation on the same legal parcel.

Borges and Gurr purchased an eleven-acre property in Ukiah and sought to cultivate medical cannabis there. They acknowledged that they had not cultivated cannabis at that property before January 1, 2016. Their application initially identified a coastal property in Manchester as the prior-cultivation site, but they later relied on a property in Willits. The opinion states that they were no longer cultivating at the Willits property when they applied and had abandoned cultivation there before January 1, 2016. On July 9, 2018, the County denied the application for failure to satisfy the proof-of-prior-cultivation requirement.

The County later established cannabis accommodation and prohibition districts. On December 4, 2018, the Board of Supervisors designated the Boonville Road/Woodyglen district, where the plaintiffs’ property was located, as a cannabis-prohibition district. The record described public concerns about water demands, traffic, and the residential character of the neighborhood, as well as substantial support for the designation.

Summary-judgment standard

The court explained that summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The nonmoving party must present specific admissible evidence from which a reasonable jury could rule in its favor; conclusory or speculative statements are insufficient.

Permit-denial claim

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the current-cultivation requirement did not apply because they sought a relocation permit. It read section 10A.17.080(B)(3) as allowing relocation only for people who first establish proof of prior cultivation under section (B)(1). Because the plaintiffs did not show prior and current cultivation at the same origin site, they did not satisfy that requirement.

For the class-of-one claim, the plaintiffs had to identify similarly situated applicants who were treated differently and show that the difference lacked a rational basis. The court found that the six applicants identified by the plaintiffs had not received final permits; five had provided proof of prior and current cultivation at their origin sites, and the sixth applicant’s application was still under review and contained different evidence. The plaintiffs therefore had not produced evidence of a similarly situated applicant who received a relocation permit without satisfying the same requirement.

The court also held that the plaintiffs lacked evidence showing that the County had no rational basis for treating them differently. The County could rationally distinguish the plaintiffs because they were not currently cultivating at the Willits origin site, had not cultivated there since the 1980s, and no longer owned or controlled that site. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact on the permit-denial claim.

Rezoning claim

The court separately rejected the claim that the County rezoned the Boonville Road/Woodyglen district to target the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had not shown that similarly situated people were treated differently, and they acknowledged that the prohibition designation affected everyone within the district. The court also found no evidence that the County lacked a rational basis for the zoning decision.

The court relied on the County’s lengthy consultant and public-participation process, the Planning Commission’s unanimous recommendation, the Board of Supervisors’ approval, and public concerns about water, traffic, and neighborhood character. It concluded that these were legitimate land-use considerations and that the plaintiffs had not shown an equal-protection violation.

Other motion and disposition

The court denied the plaintiffs’ administrative motion to reopen Diane Curry’s deposition. It found that the plaintiffs had not shown a basis for reopening the deposition and that the cited declaration did not waive attorney-client privilege.

The court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment. It concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to raise a triable issue of fact on their Equal Protection claim.