Majo v. Sony Interactive Entertainment LLC

Background

Emma Majo, a former Sony employee, brought a proposed class and collective action alleging gender bias at Sony. She alleged that she was harassed, denied promotion, demoted, and terminated because of gender bias and because she complained about gender bias. She also alleged that female employees or employees who identify as female were paid less than similarly situated male employees and denied promotions.

The first amended complaint asserted 13 claims: a nationwide collective claim under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act and Equal Pay Act; a declaratory-judgment claim; six California-law class claims; and five individual California-law claims. Sony moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing mainly that the complaint did not allege enough specific facts to make the claims plausible. Sony also moved under Rule 12(f) to strike the class allegations.

Motion to Dismiss

The court dismissed most claims because the allegations were largely conclusory. For the federal Equal Pay Act claim, Majo did not describe her work or identify how it was substantially equal to the work of a male employee who was paid more. The related California Equal Pay Act claim failed for the same reason.

The court also dismissed the California class claims concerning compensation, failure to promote, disparate impact, harassment, failure to prevent or investigate discrimination and harassment, final wages, unfair competition, and the Private Attorneys General Act. The court found insufficient facts supporting discrimination or harassment, dismissed the failure-to-prevent claim because the underlying discrimination and harassment claims were not plausibly pleaded, dismissed the final-wages claim because Majo did not oppose Sony’s request, and dismissed the derivative claims because their underlying claims failed.

Among the individual claims, the court denied dismissal of the common-law wrongful-termination claim based on public policy. It also found plausible Majo’s claim that her termination violated the California Fair Employment and Housing Act and her retaliation claim under that Act, based on her allegation that she was terminated soon after complaining about gender bias and that Sony gave a false explanation for the termination. The court found plausible her whistleblower-retaliation claim under California Labor Code section 1102.5(b), because reporting gender bias could plausibly report conduct violating the Fair Employment and Housing Act.

The court dismissed Majo’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim because it was based mainly on ordinary personnel-management actions and the alleged gender-biased comments did not meet the required level of extreme conduct. It dismissed her negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim because the allegations described intentional rather than negligent conduct. Within the claim concerning termination, the court dismissed the harassment subclaim but allowed the discrimination and retaliation theories to survive the pleading challenge. It dismissed the separate whistleblower claim under California Labor Code section 232.5(c) because Majo did not plausibly allege that the information she disclosed was previously unknown.

The court dismissed the declaratory-judgment claim as redundant because it sought relief coextensive with the other claims. Although some individual claims survived the pleading analysis, the court dismissed the entire complaint because dismissal of the federal claim eliminated federal-question jurisdiction, and the court therefore lacked jurisdiction over the state-law claims.

Motion to Strike and Disposition

The court denied Sony’s motion to strike the proposed nationwide and California class allegations without prejudice. It held that deciding class issues at the pleading stage was premature because Majo’s allegations were still developing and class-certification issues generally benefit from a developed factual record. The court stated that Sony could raise the issue again in a later motion.

The court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. Majo could file a second amended complaint within 28 days and was required to attach a redlined comparison with the first amended complaint. The court denied the motion to strike without prejudice and resolved ECF No. 24.