Jones v. Perez-Pantoja
- Thomas Hixson
- 3:22-cv-00773
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 6
In Jones v. Perez-Pantoja, Magistrate Judge Hixson found a First Amendment retaliation claim cognizable and ordered service on the defendants.
Amos Jones and defendants A. Turingan and I. Perez-Pantoja; the case proceeds against the two correctional officers on the pleaded First Amendment retaliation claim.
What happened
In Jones v. Perez-Pantoja, Amos Jones, a prisoner, alleged that Correctional Training Facility officers A. Turingan and I. Perez-Pantoja retaliated against him after he filed grievances about them. He claimed the officers interfered with his work assignment, ordered him to leave it, and conducted a retaliatory cell search.
The court’s preliminary review found that the complaint stated a claim for retaliation under the First Amendment. The court ordered that the two officers be served and set deadlines for dispositive motions, responses, and replies. The order did not decide whether the alleged retaliation actually occurred.
Magistrate Judge Thomas S. Hixson also explained the procedures for discovery, filings, address changes, and possible summary-judgment motions as the case proceeds.
The detailed version
- Jones v. Perez-Pantoja · No. 3:22-cv-00773
- Thomas Hixson
- May 9, 2022
Background
Amos Jones, who was incarcerated at Correctional Training Facility–Central, filed a self-represented civil-rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against correctional officers A. Turingan and I. Perez-Pantoja. Jones paid the filing fee.
Jones alleged that he filed a grievance against Perez-Pantoja on April 19, 2020, concerning Perez-Pantoja’s failure to follow health and safety protocols during a cell search. Jones alleged that, after learning about the grievance, Turingan harassed him and told him to find another cell. Jones then filed grievances concerning Turingan’s conduct and alleged that Turingan prevented him from participating in his work assignment.
Jones further alleged that, after he filed another grievance, Perez-Pantoja ordered him to leave his work assignment on May 20, 2021. According to the complaint, Perez-Pantoja said that Jones should have thought about filing a grievance against Turingan and that Jones would never work in the building while the two officers worked there. Jones also alleged that Turingan later conducted a retaliatory cell search and that his earphones were altered to justify their theft.
Screening and legal standard
Because Jones was a prisoner suing government employees, the court was required to screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. That screening requires the court to identify claims that are legally sufficient and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek money from an immune defendant. The court also explained that self-represented pleadings must be read liberally, but must still provide more than labels, conclusions, or an unsupported assertion that the defendants caused harm.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a federal right was violated by a person acting under state authority. The court described a First Amendment retaliation claim in prison as requiring allegations that a state actor took an adverse action because the prisoner engaged in protected conduct, the action chilled the prisoner’s exercise of First Amendment rights, and the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.
Ruling and case management
The court concluded that, read liberally, Jones’s allegations stated a cognizable First Amendment retaliation claim against both Turingan and Perez-Pantoja. “Cognizable” means that the claim was sufficient to proceed past this initial screening; the order did not decide the ultimate truth of the allegations or whether Jones would prevail.
The court ordered service of the complaint and order on Turingan and Perez-Pantoja through the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s electronic-service program. It directed the department and the California Attorney General’s Office to report on whether the defendants would waive service, with United States Marshals Service assistance for any defendant who did not waive service.
The court ordered defendants to file a summary-judgment motion or another dispositive motion within 91 days after the order was filed, unless they informed the court that summary judgment was not appropriate. Jones’s opposition would be due 28 days after the motion, and any reply would be due 14 days after the opposition. The court stated that no hearing would be held on the motion. It also authorized discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and described requirements for serving filings, keeping the court informed of address changes, and requesting extensions of time.
Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.