D. v. Kijakazi

Background

Jesse D. (“Labryssa”) appealed the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying her application for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. She alleged disability based on bipolar disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, cyclical vomiting, asthma, and gender dysphoria. After a hearing, the administrative law judge found that Labryssa was not disabled. The Appeals Council affirmed that decision.

The administrative law judge found four severe impairments—bipolar disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and gender dysphoria—and found cyclical vomiting and asthma non-severe. The judge determined that Labryssa could perform work at all physical exertional levels, subject to limits for simple, routine tasks in a low-stress environment with only occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and the public. Based on vocational-expert testimony, the judge found that Labryssa could not return to her past work but could perform jobs such as hand packager, routing clerk, or housekeeper.

Issues and Analysis

Labryssa challenged the administrative law judge’s treatment of her symptom testimony, the evaluation of Dr. Laura Jean Catlin’s psychological opinion, the finding that cyclical vomiting and asthma were non-severe, and the residual functional capacity determination. The Commissioner argued that substantial evidence supported the administrative law judge’s decision.

The court upheld the administrative law judge’s reasons for partially discounting Labryssa’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms. The court found that the administrative law judge identified inconsistencies between the testimony and medical records, and also cited evidence that medication and treatment had improved some symptoms. The court emphasized that the administrative law judge did not reject all of Labryssa’s testimony.

The court ruled, however, that the administrative law judge did not properly evaluate Dr. Catlin’s opinion. Under the applicable regulations, medical opinions are evaluated primarily for supportability and consistency. The administrative law judge stated that Dr. Catlin had not sufficiently explained the marked limitations and that the opinion was inconsistent with the longitudinal record, but did not meaningfully analyze Dr. Catlin’s detailed examination, testing, and 23-category assessment. The court also found that the administrative law judge could not rely only on the reasons used to discount Labryssa’s testimony because Dr. Catlin’s opinion was based on her own clinical interview, mental-status examination, cognitive testing, and depression inventory as well as Labryssa’s statements.

The court found no prejudicial error in the step-two finding that cyclical vomiting and asthma were non-severe because the administrative law judge continued through the remaining steps. But the court held that those conditions still had to be considered when determining residual functional capacity, even if they were non-severe. The court concluded that the residual functional capacity finding was not supported by substantial evidence because the administrative law judge failed to properly consider Dr. Catlin’s opinion and failed to account for cyclical vomiting and asthma.

Ruling and Disposition

Judge Beth Labson Freeman held that remand for further administrative proceedings, rather than an immediate award of benefits, was appropriate. Further proceedings were needed to consider the medical evidence and all of Labryssa’s impairments in formulating an appropriate residual functional capacity, and the record did not establish what that capacity would be or whether jobs would exist for a person with those limitations.

The court granted in part and denied in part Labryssa’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, reversed the denial of benefits, and remanded the matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with the order.