Herrera v. United States District Court

Background

Yesenia Herrera, a federal prisoner housed at FCI-Dublin, was serving a 120-month federal sentence for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and distribution of methamphetamine. Before that federal sentence, a California state court sentenced her to jail time following state drug convictions. The state court ordered 309 days of credit, consisting of 155 days of actual-time credit and 154 days of good-time credit. Herrera was released from state custody after serving 151 days.

When Herrera was later sentenced federally, the federal sentencing court ordered that she receive an additional 309 days of credit for time served on related conduct in state custody. The Bureau of Prisons initially awarded 151 days but later removed them after the Ninth Circuit ruled that the sentencing court lacked authority to grant the credits because that authority belonged to the Bureau of Prisons. The Bureau then added 700 days of credit for other time spent in official detention.

Herrera sought restoration of the 151 days she had spent in state custody. She also asserted, without supporting evidence, that the Bureau of Prisons removed the credits in retaliation for her direct appeal.

Administrative exhaustion

The court explained that federal law does not expressly require exhaustion of administrative remedies before filing a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. However, the Ninth Circuit generally requires petitioners to pursue available administrative and judicial remedies as a prudential matter. Exceptions may apply when administrative remedies offer no genuine opportunity for relief, pursuing them would be futile, immediate judicial relief is needed to avoid irreparable injury, or a substantial constitutional question is raised.

The respondent submitted a Bureau of Prisons declaration stating that Herrera had not filed any administrative remedy concerning the prior custody credit. Herrera did not respond to the respondent’s answer. Although she marked “yes” on her petition when asked whether she had filed a grievance or sought an administrative remedy, the case number and date she provided corresponded to her federal criminal case and the Ninth Circuit’s decision concerning the sentencing court’s credit order. The court therefore found that Herrera had not shown exhaustion or an applicable exception.

Double-credit rule

The court also ruled that, even if Herrera had exhausted her remedies, 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) barred the requested relief. That statute allows credit for time spent in official detention before a sentence begins only when the time has not already been credited against another sentence. Because the 151 days had been applied to Herrera’s state sentence, the court held that the statute prohibited using those same days again for her federal sentence.

The court rejected Herrera’s retaliation contention because she offered no evidence supporting it. The respondent argued that the Bureau simply waited until the judicial process ended before removing the 151 days, and the court described that contention as sound.

Disposition

The petition for habeas relief was DENIED on the ground of non-exhaustion and was also DENIED on the additional ground that Section 3585 barred relief. The court entered judgment in favor of the respondent and ordered the file closed. It stated that a certificate of appealability was not required for a federal prisoner to appeal the denial of a § 2241 petition.