Shannon v. Buttigieg

Background

Shane Shannon was an air-traffic controller at Napa Tower. He sought openings at Oakland Tower on two occasions in 2014 and 2015. The selecting official, an Oakland Tower air-traffic manager, did not select him. Shannon brought a disparate-treatment claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which prohibits employment discrimination because of age against individuals who are at least 40 years old. The opinion notes that Shannon had previously asserted retaliation claims but abandoned them in his opposition.

Shannon was in his mid-40s during the relevant period and was on the eligible-candidate lists for both openings. The candidates selected instead were younger than 40. For the first opening, the selected candidate had a bachelor’s degree in aeronautics and experience at a Level 5 tower facility, while Shannon worked at a Level 4 tower facility and had completed college coursework without receiving a degree. For the third opening, one selected candidate had a bachelor’s degree and experience at a Level 9 tower facility, and the other had a bachelor’s degree and experience at a Level 6 tower facility.

Shannon argued that the selecting official undervalued his military experience, college coursework, and experience at other air-traffic facilities. He also relied on a coworker’s belief that age discrimination occurred and on hiring information showing that seven selections from employee-requested-reassignment lists went to people between ages 30 and 37, even though four of the 63 candidates were at least 40. Shannon also argued that the selecting official misdescribed one selected candidate’s prior certification and used the word “poised” as a code for youth.

Legal standard

The court applied the summary-judgment standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court viewed the evidence and reasonable inferences in Shannon’s favor.

For an ADEA failure-to-promote claim, the plaintiff must ultimately prove that age was the “but-for” cause of the employment decision. The court used the burden-shifting framework commonly applied to circumstantial evidence of discrimination: after a plaintiff presents an initial showing of discrimination, the employer must provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason; the plaintiff must then show that reason was a pretext, meaning a false explanation masking discrimination.

Court’s analysis

For the first opening, the court held that the government identified legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for selecting the other candidate: his higher-level tower-facility experience and bachelor’s degree. The court declined to second-guess the employer’s selection criteria because Shannon did not claim that those criteria had a different impact on older applicants. It also found that his in-route and Navy experience could not, on the record presented, be equated with experience at an FAA tower facility. Shannon had not identified evidence that the stated reasons were pretextual.

The court also found that the hiring-history evidence did not create a genuine factual dispute. The pool contained only four candidates age 40 or older, and the court concluded that the evidence did not show a stark pattern of discrimination that could not be explained by factors other than age. Shannon also provided no evidence about the qualifications of the other three older candidates. The court noted that the selecting official had chosen three managers during the relevant period, including one person over age 40.

For the third opening, the court reached the same conclusion. It found legitimate reasons based on the selected candidates’ education and experience at higher-level tower facilities. The court rejected Shannon’s argument that the selecting official deliberately lied about one candidate’s certification history, reasoning that the record did not support a reasonable inference of an intentional lie. It also rejected the argument that “poised” was a code word for “young,” finding that the word fit the official’s description of the candidate’s ability to remain calm under pressure.

Disposition

The court concluded that no genuine dispute of material fact existed concerning pretext for either opening. It granted the government’s motion for summary judgment. The order disposed of Docket No. 78, directed the Clerk to enter final judgment, and ordered the file closed. The court did not address the government’s remaining arguments about damages because summary judgment was granted on the issue of pretext.