Burghardt v. Franz

Background

Darryl Burghardt brought three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against state officials for violating constitutional rights. He alleged violations of the First and Eighth Amendments during his incarceration at Pelican Bay State Prison. Defendants J. Franz, G. Kelley, and K. Bragger filed a motion for partial summary judgment. Burghardt partially opposed it.

The order addressed an incident on August 27, 2012, involving Franz. Burghardt asked Franz for a grievance form and then asked to speak with Franz’s supervisor after Franz said he did not have any forms. Burghardt refused to relinquish his food tray to get a supervisor’s attention. Burghardt testified that Franz said words to the effect of, “You’re lucky you’re eating” or “You’re lucky if you eat tomorrow.” Burghardt understood those statements as threats that he would not be allowed to eat if he sought to file a grievance. Franz stated that he told Burghardt he would be placed on paper-tray status and would not receive his evening meal unless he gave up the tray. The opinion states that no food was withheld from Burghardt.

Rulings

First, Burghardt did not oppose summary judgment on claims 1 and 2 against Kelley or on claim 3 against Bragger. The court therefore granted defendants’ unopposed motion for summary judgment on those claims and dismissed Kelley and Bragger from the case.

The remaining issue was whether Franz was entitled to summary judgment on claim 1 concerning the August 27, 2012 incident. Franz argued that qualified immunity—legal protection for government officials unless they violated a constitutional right that was clearly established—protected him because no reasonable jury could find that his statement was a retaliatory threat. The parties agreed that, by 2012, a threat of harm could qualify as an adverse action in a First Amendment retaliation claim even if the threat was never carried out.

The court held that, viewing the evidence in Burghardt’s favor, a reasonable factfinder could interpret Franz’s statements as threatening punishment or other adverse action if Burghardt obtained and submitted a grievance. A jury must decide whether Franz made the statements and whether they were reasonably understood as threats of retaliation. The court therefore denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on claim 1 as to Franz regarding the August 27, 2012 incident.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the motion for partial summary judgment. Kelley and Bragger were dismissed from the case. Claim 1 against Franz, based on both the August 27, 2012 and September 14, 2012 incidents, and claim 2 against Franz, based on the September 14, 2012 incident, will proceed.