Mills v. Mitchell

Background

Jeffrey Mills, proceeding without a lawyer, sued San Quentin State Prison officers K. Mitchell, E. Evans, J. Van Blarcom, B. Walls, and S. Arana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged retaliation for exercising his First Amendment right to file a grievance. The remaining claims concerned alleged changes to his prison job, delayed payment for May 2015 work, a June 2015 cell move, and continuing harassment. Mills also alleged that Mitchell, Evans, Van Blarcom, and Walls participated in, allowed, or covered up Arana’s actions.

The court had previously ruled that Mills exhausted the claims concerning the earlier incidents, but not claims concerning alleged February 2016 events. The court left the February 2016 claims dismissed without prejudice and stated that Mills could refile them after exhausting the prison grievance process. The claims at issue in this order were the earlier claims against Arana and the related claims against Mitchell, Evans, Van Blarcom, and Walls.

Summary-judgment standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court must view disputed evidence in the nonmoving party’s favor, but the nonmoving party must identify specific evidence that could allow a reasonable jury to rule in that party’s favor.

For a prisoner’s First Amendment retaliation claim, the prisoner must show that a state actor took an adverse action because of protected conduct, that the action chilled the prisoner’s exercise of First Amendment rights, and that the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.

Ruling on Arana’s motion

The court granted Arana’s motion for summary judgment. It concluded that Mills had not presented enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Arana retaliated against him.

Regarding the May 2015 job reassignment, the court found that prison records showed the classification committee—not Arana—assigned Mills to the new position because his prior position had been eliminated. The new position had the same pay grade. Mills did not dispute that the prior position had been eliminated or provide specific evidence that Arana controlled or influenced the reassignment.

The court also held that Arana’s restrictions on Mills’s job responsibilities did not support a retaliation claim. The record showed that Arana limited Mills’s movement because of the rules-violation report involving possession of a cellphone charger and because of prison-security concerns. The court found no evidence that Arana had falsified or caused the allegedly false charge. It concluded that limiting access to other prison tiers served a legitimate correctional purpose. The court further held that Arana’s statement that Mills could find another job if he wanted different duties was not an adverse action that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from complaining.

As to Mills’s May 2015 pay, the court found no evidence that Arana controlled the payment or failed to enter Mills’s hours on time. The accounting office issued the pay, and an investigation found that Arana timely entered the hours. The court concluded that the timing of the delayed payment and Mills’s other allegations did not create a genuine factual dispute about retaliatory intent.

As to the June 2015 cell move, the court acknowledged a dispute about whether Arana carried out the move. But it found no evidence that Arana requested or ordered it. Mills did not dispute that only a sergeant or someone more senior could authorize such a move, and Arana was not a sergeant at that time. The court therefore held that no reasonable jury could find that Arana moved Mills’s cell in retaliation.

The court separately addressed an August 2015 job reassignment mentioned in the record. It stated that the complaint and reopening order did not clearly identify that reassignment as a challenged adverse action, but held that the claim would fail on the merits in any event because the evidence showed that an inmate-assignment lieutenant, not Arana, handled the reassignment.

Finally, the court granted summary judgment on Mills’s general harassment claim. It did not consider harassment alleged after September 27, 2015, because the last grievance identified as exhausting the claims was filed on that date. For the earlier period, Mills identified no specific harassment beyond the job changes, delayed pay, and cell move, which the court had already found were not retaliatory.

Other defendants and disposition

The claims against Mitchell, Evans, Van Blarcom, and Walls depended on the alleged retaliation by Arana. Because the court found that Arana’s conduct did not violate the Constitution, it stated that the related claims against the other defendants would also fail as a matter of law, even if adequately pleaded.

The court did not yet grant summary judgment for those four defendants. Instead, it gave Mills notice that it intended to enter summary judgment in their favor and ordered him to show cause within 28 days why it should not do so. The court instructed Mills not to reargue the summary judgment ruling for Arana. It held the four defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in abeyance pending Mills’s response. This order terminated only Arana’s summary-judgment motion.