Gordon v. Stanford Medical Chief

Background

Terry Gordon, an inmate at Santa Rita Jail, filed this civil-rights action without a lawyer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The remaining claim alleged that Deputy DeMott and Deputy Vancott violated Gordon’s Fourteenth Amendment due-process rights by failing to protect him from pain and injury while transporting him from Stanford Medical Center to the jail after surgery for spinal stenosis in his neck.

Gordon was taken to Stanford for surgery on September 20, 2019. On September 23, the deputies provided security for his return to the jail. A nurse told the deputies that Gordon was medically fit to return in the jail van and did not need an ambulance. The van had metal seats without cushions, but the discharge papers did not impose transportation restrictions. The deputies requested a wheelchair, helped Gordon into the van, selected an accessible seat, used a sandbag to help him step into the van, and left one hand uncuffed so he could drink water.

Gordon testified that the more-than-one-hour ride caused very severe pain whenever the van hit a bump or made a turn. He also claimed that the deputies failed to obtain a wheelchair when they arrived at the jail, forcing him to walk about 50 yards to his cell or the infirmary. He further asserted that the ride shifted surgical hardware and caused a dip in his neck. Medical records described improvement after surgery, and medical professionals who examined Gordon and reviewed his x-rays did not find that the ride shifted the hardware, worsened his surgical wounds, or caused a new injury.

Legal standard and analysis

The court applied the summary-judgment standard. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

For Gordon’s due-process failure-to-protect claim, the court explained that he had to show: (1) the defendants intentionally made a decision about his confinement conditions; (2) those conditions created a substantial risk of serious harm; (3) the defendants failed to take objectively reasonable available measures to reduce that risk; and (4) that failure caused his injuries.

The court treated Gordon’s testimony about the severe pain from the van ride and the walk as sufficient to create a triable issue on whether those conditions posed a substantial risk of serious harm. It nevertheless found no triable issue on the third element concerning the van ride. The deputies relied on the nurse’s advice that the van was safe and that an ambulance was unnecessary. The court found that reliance reasonable because the deputies were not medical professionals, the discharge papers did not restrict transportation, and the deputies took additional steps to reduce risks. The court also concluded that a reasonable officer would not have stopped on the Dumbarton Bridge to seek an ambulance based on the limited evidence of pain there and the safety risks of stopping on a highway.

The court reached a different conclusion about the alleged failure to obtain a wheelchair after the van arrived. It was required to assume Gordon’s sworn statement was true for purposes of the motion, even though the defendants disputed it. The court held that, if the deputies deliberately refused to look for a wheelchair, a reasonable factfinder could conclude they failed to take an objectively reasonable measure to prevent serious pain from the walk.

Even so, the court found no triable issue on causation. Gordon had not produced medical evidence that the van ride caused the surgical hardware to shift or caused another injury. The court also found no evidence that the walk from the van caused an injury. Because the evidence did not create a triable issue on causation, and did not create one on the reasonable-measures element for the van ride, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment.

Rulings

The conclusion states that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted. The court also denied Gordon’s motion to subpoena a witness to trial as moot, ordered the Clerk to enter judgment, and closed the file. The defendants’ motion for an extension of time was granted earlier in the order.