Chand v. Regan

Background

Sharon S. Chand, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Michael S. Regan, identified as the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Chand alleged that she was disabled by several medical conditions, including chronic venous insufficiency, post-thrombotic syndrome, pulmonary embolism, Achilles tendonitis, heel spurs, inflammation, and major depressive disorder. She alleged that these conditions affected her circulation, ability to walk and stand for extended periods, sleep, concentration, and thinking.

Chand worked at the EPA’s Office of Civil Rights beginning in September 2013. She was later promoted to Equal Employment Opportunity Specialist and was terminated on September 18, 2015, shortly before the end of her two-year probationary period. She alleged that the termination was attributed to performance issues, but that disability discrimination and earlier workplace conduct also played a role.

Her complaint asserted four types of claims: disability discrimination based on disparate treatment, a disability-related hostile work environment, retaliation, and failure to provide reasonable accommodations. In response to the motion, Chand clarified that her claims arose under Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act and that she did not oppose dismissal of any claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. She also conceded that punitive damages were unavailable.

Legal standard

The court considered the motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. At this stage, the court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true and viewed them in the light most favorable to Chand. The court did not consider new allegations or exhibits submitted with Chand’s opposition because a Rule 12(b)(6) motion generally examines the complaint itself.

Disparate-treatment claim

The court explained that Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act provides the exclusive remedy for federal employees alleging disability discrimination based on disparate treatment. Chand had to allege that she had a disability, was otherwise qualified for the job, and suffered discrimination because of her disability. She also had to allege that her disability was a “but-for” cause of the employment action, meaning the action would not have occurred without the disability.

The court concluded that Chand had adequately alleged that she was qualified for the position. Her allegations included a merit-based promotion shortly before her termination, positive reviews in her prior position, and the absence of a mid-year review in her new position. The court rejected the argument that Chand had to disprove the employer’s stated performance reason at the pleading stage. The motion to dismiss was denied as to this claim.

Hostile-work-environment claim

The court noted that the Ninth Circuit had not expressly recognized a hostile-work-environment claim under the Rehabilitation Act, although other courts in the district had recognized such a claim. Chand alleged numerous incidents involving her supervisor, including being directed to perform tasks while on sick leave, being reprimanded for working remotely, and being prevented from starting work early to find disabled parking.

The court concluded that these allegations described more than ordinary workplace difficulties and included conduct allegedly related to Chand’s disability. The motion to dismiss was denied as to the hostile-work-environment claim.

Retaliation claim

Chand alleged that her September 2015 termination was retaliation for a February 2015 complaint about her supervisor and the workplace environment. The court stated that a retaliation claim requires allegations of protected activity, a materially adverse employment action, and a causal connection between the two.

The court found that the alleged gap between Chand’s complaint and termination was too long, without direct or other circumstantial evidence, to support an inference of causation. The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss as to the retaliation claim.

Failure-to-accommodate claim

Chand identified seven alleged failures to provide reasonable accommodations, involving work schedules, leave, reporting time, telework, flexible start times, and a chair at a work event. The court found that two of the requests were alleged to have been granted, so those approvals could not themselves support a failure-to-accommodate claim.

For the remaining allegations, the court found that Chand had not alleged exhaustion of the required administrative process. The court stated that federal regulations generally require an employee alleging disability discrimination to consult an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission counselor within 45 days of the alleged discriminatory matter or personnel action. Chand did not allege that she made that contact within 45 days of the alleged accommodation denials. The motion to dismiss was granted as to the failure-to-accommodate claim.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss. It granted the motion as to the retaliation and failure-to-accommodate claims, denied it as to the disparate-treatment and hostile-work-environment claims, and struck the punitive-damages claim. The court stated that Chand could file an amended complaint within 30 days to address the deficiencies identified in the order.