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N.D. Cal.Procedural orderFiled July 1, 2022

Woodruff v. De Facto Barrett Daffin Frappier Treder & Weiss, LLP

Judge
Saundra Armstrong
Docket
4:21-cv-06862
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
4
Civil ProcedureMotion to DismissPro Se
In one sentence

In Woodruff v. De Facto Barrett Daffin Frappier Treder & Weiss, Judge Armstrong denied the pro se plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider an earlier dismissal.

Who this affects

The ruling affected plaintiffs Kevin Woodruff, Tanya Stutson, and Wanag Tahatan-Bey, who were proceeding without lawyers, and defendant Barrett Daffin Frappier Treder & Weiss, LLP.

What happened

Woodruff v. De Facto Barrett Daffin Frappier Treder & Weiss concerns a lawsuit by Kevin Woodruff, Tanya Stutson, and Wanag Tahatan-Bey. They filed a document called “Trial by Affidavit,” but it did not clearly describe facts or individual claims. The court had previously dismissed the action without leave to amend.

The plaintiffs asked the court to reconsider that dismissal under a California reconsideration law. Because the case was in federal court, the court treated the request as a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). The plaintiffs had also filed a notice of appeal the same day, creating uncertainty about whether the district court had authority to decide the motion.

The court addressed the motion anyway and denied it. Judge Armstrong said the plaintiffs had not identified new evidence, a change in controlling law, clear error, or injustice; instead, they repeated arguments about the earlier dismissal. The court also said that, if it lacked authority to decide the motion, it did not wish to entertain or grant it, so seeking a return of the case from the appeals court was unwarranted.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Woodruff v. De Facto Barrett Daffin Frappier Treder & Weiss, LLP · No. 4:21-cv-06862
Judge
Saundra Armstrong
Date
July 1, 2022

Background

Kevin Woodruff, Tanya Stutson, and Wanag Tahatan-Bey, proceeding without lawyers, filed a document titled “Trial by Affidavit.” The document did not provide a discernable factual background or individual claims for relief. Barrett Daffin Frappier Treder & Weiss, LLP, which the plaintiffs had sued under the name “De Facto Barrett Daffin Frappier Treder & Weiss, LLP,” moved to dismiss or, alternatively, for a more definite statement.

The court previously granted the motion to dismiss without leave to amend, and judgment was entered. The earlier dismissal order noted that the filing did not state individual claims. It also addressed the plaintiffs’ reference to the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act and found that allowing an amendment to assert such a claim was unwarranted.

Motion for reconsideration and jurisdiction

The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal and a “Petition for Reconsideration Pursuant to Civil Procedure Section 1008” on the same day. The court construed the petition as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), because federal procedural rules apply in federal court.

The court noted uncertainty about its jurisdiction to decide the motion. A notice of appeal generally transfers authority over the appealed matters to the court of appeals. A notice of appeal does not do so when a motion for reconsideration was already pending, but the court explained that it generally lacks jurisdiction over a reconsideration motion filed after the notice of appeal. Here, the notice and motion were filed on the same day, but the notice was docketed first. The court therefore stated that jurisdiction might be lacking.

Merits of reconsideration request

The court nevertheless addressed the motion in the interest of judicial economy. Under Rule 59(e), reconsideration may be appropriate when there is newly discovered evidence, clear error or a manifestly unjust decision, or an intervening change in controlling law. The court described reconsideration as an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly and said it cannot be used to relitigate old matters or raise arguments that could have been made before judgment.

The court found that the plaintiffs did not identify newly discovered evidence or an intervening change in controlling law. They also did not identify clear error or injustice. Instead, the court found that they repeated issues underlying the motion to dismiss, including arguments about the National Economic Stabilization and Recovery Act, the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, and their assertion that an affidavit should stand as true unless rebutted. The court stated that the plaintiffs could have raised those arguments earlier. It also stated that no law or equitable mechanism creates a “Trial by Affidavit.”

Disposition

Assuming it had jurisdiction, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. Alternatively, if jurisdiction was lacking, the court stated that it did not wish to entertain or grant such a motion and that asking the court of appeals to return the case for that purpose was unwarranted. The order did not alter the earlier dismissal judgment.

The authoritative version

Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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