Rangel v. Twitter Foundation

Background

Adrian Rangel, representing himself, sued Twitter Inc. and Jack Dorsey after Twitter suspended his account following a tweet stating “HANG THEM ALL.” Rangel alleged claims for breach of contract, unlawful interference with interstate commerce, wire fraud, “shareholder fraud/public fraud,” and violation of California’s Uniform Electronic Transactions Act. The court also noted that Rangel had previously asserted constitutional claims, which had been dismissed for lack of state action.

Rangel’s account was governed by Twitter’s Terms of Service and policies concerning abusive behavior, hateful conduct, and violent threats. The Terms of Service stated that Twitter could suspend or terminate an account “at any time for any or no reason,” including when Twitter reasonably believed the user had violated its terms or policies. The policies prohibited, among other things, content expressing a desire for death or making violent threats.

Claims Against Dorsey

The court held that Rangel failed to state any claim against Dorsey. Rangel made conclusory allegations that Dorsey participated in suspending the account or was personally part of Rangel’s contract with Twitter, but alleged no plausible supporting facts. The court dismissed all claims against Dorsey.

Communications Decency Act

The court held that Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act protected Twitter from all of Rangel’s claims. Section 230(c)(1) generally prevents treating an interactive computer service as the publisher or speaker of information provided by another content provider. The court found that Twitter was an interactive computer service, that Rangel supplied the information at issue, and that Rangel’s claims challenged Twitter’s publishing decision to exclude his content and suspend his account. The court treated those decisions as traditional publishing functions, including deciding whether to withdraw content.

The court also held that Rangel’s contract claim was based on Twitter’s discretionary right to act as a publisher and therefore was not different for purposes of the Section 230 analysis. The court did not need to decide Twitter’s separate argument that Section 230(c)(2) also provided immunity.

Independent Pleading Problems

The court ruled that the claims would fail even if Section 230 did not apply.

- Contract: Rangel did not plausibly allege that Twitter breached a promise or that the suspension caused him damages. Under the Terms of Service, Twitter could suspend his account when it reasonably believed that his tweet violated its policies. The court found that belief reasonable in light of the tweet’s expression of a desire for death against a group. Rangel demanded $100 million in compensatory damages but did not allege actual harm in his complaint. - Interstate-commerce interference: The claim lacked an identifiable or legally recognized theory. - Wire fraud: The claim failed because the wire-fraud statute did not provide Rangel with a private right to sue and because he did not plead fraud with the required detail. The court rejected the idea that an alleged online breach of contract automatically constitutes wire fraud. - “Shareholder fraud/public fraud”: Rangel did not allege that he bought Twitter stock, so he lacked standing for a shareholder-fraud theory. His other fraud allegations were vague and did not satisfy the ordinary pleading rules or the heightened detail required for fraud claims. - California’s Uniform Electronic Transactions Act: The court found no discernible connection between that law, which gives electronic signatures legal effect, and Rangel’s allegations. It also held that the law did not provide a private right of action.

Disposition

The court granted Twitter’s motion to dismiss and denied leave to amend because amendment would be futile. The court stated that dismissal was with prejudice. The opinion was signed by Judge Charles R. Breyer.