Jones v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation
- Thomas Hixson
- 3:15-cv-02726
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 11
In Jones v. National Railroad, Judge Hixson ruled on trial-evidence requests, excluding much proposed evidence while allowing Jones’s speed and mental-health evidence.
Amanda Jones and the defendants in the pending personal-injury case, particularly the parties’ presentation of witnesses, expert opinions, medical and psychological evidence, other incidents, and damages evidence at trial.
What happened
In Jones v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, Amanda Jones asked the court to exclude evidence of her prior accidents and lawsuits. The defendants asked to exclude or limit several categories of evidence, including other incidents, medical-causation testimony, damages evidence, expert opinions, and psychological records.
The court denied Jones’s motion. It granted the defendants’ Motions in Limine Nos. 1–7, although Motion No. 7 was granted only to the extent that Jones could not use other incidents to prove negligence; the evidence could still be used for relevant impeachment. The court denied Motions Nos. 8–9, both without prejudice, granted Motions Nos. 10–15, and denied Motion No. 16. The rulings limited or excluded several damages and expert opinions but allowed Jones to testify about the bus’s speed and permitted evidence related to her psychological records.
Judge Thomas S. Hixson issued the order on July 21, 2022. The order governs what evidence may be presented at trial and does not decide the ultimate negligence or damages questions in the case.
The detailed version
- Jones v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation · No. 3:15-cv-02726
- Thomas Hixson
- July 21, 2022
Background
The court considered Amanda Jones’s Motion in Limine, ECF No. 273, and the defendants’ Motions in Limine Nos. 1–16. A motion in limine asks the court to decide before trial whether particular evidence may be presented. The court heard argument on July 21, 2022.
Jones sought to exclude evidence of her prior accidents and litigation under Rules 401, 402, and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The defendants argued that the evidence was relevant to Jones’s damages and could be used to challenge her credibility. The court found that prior accidents and litigation involving the same or similar injuries were relevant to damages and could be used for impeachment, and it denied Jones’s motion. The court noted that Jones could seek an instruction limiting the evidence’s use.
Defendants’ Motions in Limine
1. Motion No. 1: Granted. The court excluded non-party witnesses who were not testifying from the courtroom during trial under Rule 615.
2. Motion No. 2: Granted. The court excluded evidence of settlement offers or negotiations.
3. Motion No. 3: Granted. The court excluded evidence of the defendants’ liability coverage.
4. Motion No. 4: Granted. The court excluded evidence of the defendants’ financial status, profits, or wealth.
5. Motion No. 5: Granted. The court excluded evidence of subsequent remedial measures. Rule 407 generally bars using later corrective measures to prove negligence or culpable conduct, while allowing such evidence for certain other purposes. The court found that Jones had not shown a disputed issue of ownership, control, or feasibility that would allow the evidence for another purpose.
6. Motion No. 6: Granted without prejudice to Jones raising an impeachment argument at trial. The court excluded evidence of the defendants’ other personal-injury litigation because Jones had not explained how it would be used to address credibility, but it left open a later objection or request involving specific testimony.
7. Motion No. 7: Granted to the extent that Jones could not introduce other accidents or incidents involving the defendants or the bus driver as evidence of negligence. The court found that Jones had not shown the required substantial similarity between those incidents and the incident at issue. The court stated that relevant evidence could still be used for impeachment and that either party could request a limiting instruction.
8. Motion No. 8: Denied. The defendants sought to prevent Jones from testifying about the bus’s speed, arguing that her testimony lacked foundation and was inadmissible lay-opinion testimony. The court found that, as a passenger, Jones could testify about facts perceived through her own senses and that her testimony was relevant to whether the bus driver breached a duty to transport her safely.
9. Motion No. 9: Denied without prejudice. The defendants sought to exclude medical-causation evidence because Jones allegedly had not properly disclosed medical experts. The court found that Jones disclosed the names of her treating physicians but that the record did not show whether their opinions were formed during treatment. The defendants could object at trial to specific testimony under the applicable disclosure rule.
10. Motion No. 10: Granted. The court excluded evidence concerning Jones’s life-care-plan damages because it had found that the opinions of John McKinney and Nora Ostrofe were not shown to be reliable.
11. Motion No. 11: Granted. The court excluded evidence of past medical damages because Jones had not shown that she satisfied the disclosure requirements and had not provided an opposition or supporting declaration. The court also relied on its finding that McKinney’s and Ostrofe’s opinions were not shown to be reliable.
12. Motion No. 12: Granted. The court excluded Jones’s claim for damages based on missed applications to grants, scholarships, and fellowships. Although Jones disclosed the chart and identified McKinney and Ostrofe as damages experts, neither expert addressed the chart or its specific calculations, and Jones could not offer the calculations as lay testimony.
13. Motion No. 13: Granted. The court limited substitute expert Douglas Cross’s testimony to the subject matter covered in the original expert’s report and barred testimony contrary to or inconsistent with that report. The court stated that Cross could serve as a substitute for the rebuttal expert but could not testify in place of the other original expert beyond the permitted scope.
14. Motion No. 14: Granted as to John McKinney’s and Nora Ostrofe’s opinions. Applying the court’s duty to screen expert evidence for reliability, the court found that McKinney did not sufficiently explain the method used to reach his opinion. Because Ostrofe relied on McKinney’s opinion to calculate damages, the court also found that Jones had not shown the reliability of Ostrofe’s opinion.
15. Motion No. 15: Granted. The court excluded Jones’s proposed market analysis calculating professional losses from alleged job discrimination and delayed entry into the workforce. Jones could testify about matters within her own observation, such as past and current earnings, but she was not qualified to provide the proposed damages calculation, and Ostrofe’s opinion had not been shown reliable.
16. Motion No. 16: Denied. The defendants sought to exclude Jones’s psychological records based on alleged late production and the absence of psychological damages from her damages calculation. The court found that Jones had disclosed June Parks as a witness and that the defendants acknowledged she had agreed to provide a release for the records. The defendants did not explain why they had not subpoenaed the records.
Disposition and effect
The court denied Jones’s Motion in Limine; granted Defendants’ Motions in Limine Nos. 1–7; denied Defendants’ Motions in Limine Nos. 8–9 without prejudice; granted Defendants’ Motions in Limine Nos. 10–15; and denied Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 16. These rulings control the proposed trial evidence addressed in the order. The opinion does not resolve the ultimate merits of the negligence claim or determine the amount of damages.
Read the full 11-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.