Spindler v. General Motors, LLC
- William Orrick
- 3:21-cv-09311
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 11
In Spindler v. General Motors, Judge Orrick partially granted GM’s dismissal motion, dismissing the federal warranty class claim but allowing the other challenged claims to proceed.
Doug Spindler and Makesha Satterwhite, the proposed California class, and General Motors, LLC. The MMWA claim was dismissed, while the other challenged claims were allowed to proceed.
What happened
In Spindler v. General Motors, Doug Spindler and Makesha Satterwhite alleged that a defect in certain GM vehicles prevented them from recognizing that the vehicles were in park. They brought warranty and consumer-protection claims on behalf of a proposed California class.
The court granted GM’s motion to dismiss the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim because the lawsuit named only two plaintiffs, while that statute requires at least 100 named plaintiffs for this type of class action. The court denied the motion as to Satterwhite’s express-warranty and Song-Beverly Act claims, finding that she adequately alleged repeated opportunities for repair. The court also rejected GM’s arguments about notice, knowledge of the defect, and a duty to disclose.
Judge William Orrick granted GM’s motion in part and denied it in part. The remaining challenged claims were allowed to proceed as pleaded.
The detailed version
- Spindler v. General Motors, LLC · No. 3:21-cv-09311
- William Orrick
- July 21, 2022
Background
Doug Spindler and Makesha Satterwhite sued General Motors, LLC (GM) in a proposed class action involving an alleged “shifter defect” in certain Chevrolet vehicles. According to the complaint, the defect caused the vehicle to display a “Shift to Park” message even after the driver placed the vehicle in park, preventing the driver from shutting off and locking the vehicle normally.
The plaintiffs asserted claims under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA), the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California’s Unfair Competition Law, the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, express and implied warranties, and unjust enrichment. GM moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires dismissal when a complaint does not adequately state a legal claim.
Rulings
The court granted the motion as to the MMWA claim. The statute requires at least 100 named plaintiffs for this type of class action, but the First Amended Complaint named only Spindler and Satterwhite. The plaintiffs conceded that they had not corrected this issue, and the court dismissed the MMWA claim.
The court denied the motion as to Satterwhite’s breach-of-express-warranty claim. The court had previously found that the complaint did not adequately allege repeated repair efforts. The amended complaint alleged that Satterwhite had her vehicle serviced for the defect in October 2021 and later contacted the dealership to request another appointment. The dealership allegedly required her to pay $175 for a diagnostic check before inspecting the vehicle, so she did not schedule the appointment. The court held that these allegations sufficiently showed, at the pleading stage, that Satterwhite had given GM an opportunity to repair the defect again.
The court also denied the motion as to Satterwhite’s Song-Beverly Act claim. It held that her allegations that she presented the vehicle for repair more than once, complaining about the same defect, satisfied the pleading requirement concerning a reasonable number of repair attempts.
The court rejected GM’s renewed argument that the plaintiffs had not provided adequate pre-suit notice. It took judicial notice of a November 15, 2021 letter sent to GM before the lawsuit was filed and held that the letter provided sufficient notice. Because that letter resolved the issue, the court did not decide whether presenting the vehicles for repair alone would have been sufficient notice.
The court also rejected GM’s arguments that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged GM’s prior knowledge of the defect or a duty to disclose it. The court found that the alleged technical service bulletins and consumer complaints plausibly showed that GM knew about the defect when the vehicles were purchased. It further held that the alleged defect plausibly created a safety hazard and that the plaintiffs adequately alleged the elements supporting a duty to disclose. The fraud-based claims therefore could proceed as pleaded.
Disposition
Judge William Orrick’s order granted GM’s motion to dismiss with respect to the MMWA claim and otherwise denied the motion. The order did not dismiss the other claims challenged in this motion.
Read the full 11-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.