Taylor v. City and County of San Francisco
- Jeffrey White
- 4:20-cv-07692
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 8
Taylor v. City and County of San Francisco: Judge White granted defendants’ summary-judgment motion and denied Taylor’s amendment motion after finding disability claims unexhausted.
Timothy Taylor, the City and County of San Francisco, and Kevin Spore.
What happened
In Taylor v. City and County of San Francisco, Timothy Taylor, a former San Francisco Department of Public Works employee, alleged that defendants falsely said he was a threat and banned him from the workplace, forcing him to resign. He brought claims involving race, disability, age, due process, and public policy.
Taylor later sought to amend his complaint to add disability discrimination, reasonable-accommodation, and interactive-dialogue claims. He also conceded that his racial discrimination and harassment claim could not continue and that his other two claims had procedural problems.
Judge Jeffrey S. White granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied Taylor’s motion for leave to amend. The court held that Taylor had not first raised disability discrimination in his administrative complaint, and it also found that the proposed amendment was too late, lacked diligence and good cause, and would prejudice defendants.
The detailed version
- Taylor v. City and County of San Francisco · No. 4:20-cv-07692
- Jeffrey White
- July 25, 2022
Background
Timothy Taylor, a former employee of the San Francisco Department of Public Works, alleged that the City and County of San Francisco and Kevin Spore spread false statements that Taylor was not allowed on Department of Public Works property because he posed a threat to others. Taylor also alleged that Spore’s conduct caused him acute stress, that doctors recommended he avoid contact with Spore, and that defendants banned him from the premises without retracting the ban. Taylor alleged that he resigned on August 14, 2018, because he feared being the victim of violence if he returned to work.
Taylor filed an administrative complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing on August 14, 2019. That complaint alleged race-based harassment and discrimination and mentioned his exclusion from the workplace, but it did not mention disability discrimination. Taylor later filed a three-claim complaint in state court. The first claim alleged race-based discrimination, harassment, and constructive discharge under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act. The second claim was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged discrimination and due-process violations based on race, disability, and age. The third claim alleged termination in violation of public policy based on race, disability, and age. Defendants removed the case to federal court.
Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing in part that Taylor lacked evidence of racial discrimination and had not exhausted administrative remedies for age- or disability-based Fair Employment and Housing Act claims. Taylor moved for leave to amend the complaint to assert disability discrimination, failure to reasonably accommodate a disability, and failure to engage in a good-faith interactive dialogue. Taylor conceded that his race-based Fair Employment and Housing Act claim could not be sustained and that his second and third claims were procedurally flawed.
Court’s Analysis
The court explained that summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court must view the evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion, but that party must identify evidence that would allow a reasonable fact finder to rule in its favor.
The court also considered the standards governing amendments to pleadings. After a scheduling order has been entered, a party seeking to change the case generally must show good cause, with the inquiry focusing on the party’s diligence. The court stated that, under either the amendment standard or the scheduling-order standard, Taylor’s motion should be denied.
For a disability-discrimination claim under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, a plaintiff must first file a written administrative complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing within one year of the alleged discrimination. The later lawsuit generally cannot go beyond the subjects covered by that administrative complaint.
The court found that Taylor’s administrative complaint expressly raised race discrimination but did not raise mental-disability discrimination. Although the workplace ban was central to both theories, the court concluded that the race and disability theories involved different kinds of alleged misconduct and that investigating one would not likely lead to investigating the other. The court therefore held that Taylor failed to exhaust administrative remedies for the disability-based Fair Employment and Housing Act claim.
The court separately concluded that amendment would be futile even if the record supported a finding that Taylor had exhausted a disability claim. Taylor had known the facts supporting the proposed disability claim since at least February 2022 but did not seek amendment until after defendants moved for summary judgment. The court found that Taylor had not shown diligence or good cause, that the delay was unjustified at the stage of the case, and that defendants would be prejudiced by the proposed amendment.
Disposition
The court GRANTED defendants’ motion for summary judgment and DENIED Taylor’s motion for leave to amend. The court stated that it would issue a separate judgment and directed the Clerk to close the file.
Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.