Robbins v. PlushCare, Inc.
- Maxine Chesney
- 3:21-cv-03444
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 6
In Robbins v. PlushCare, Inc., Judge Chesney granted in part and denied in part PlushCare’s dismissal motion, dismissing several of Tiffany Smith’s claims and allowing amendment.
Sarah Robbins and Tiffany Smith, whose claims were treated differently, and PlushCare, Inc. and PlushCare of California, Inc., A.P.C. The order dismissed specified claims asserted by Smith, denied the motion as to Robbins’s claims because the motion was procedurally late, and allowed amendment.
What happened
In Robbins v. PlushCare, Inc., Sarah Robbins and Tiffany Smith claimed that PlushCare’s website did not place automatic-renewal terms close enough to the request for consent. PlushCare asked the court to dismiss most of the claims in the second amended complaint.
The court ruled that PlushCare’s motion was filed too late as to Robbins’s claims and denied it on that basis, without prejudice to raising the failure-to-state-a-claim defense later. As to Smith, the court dismissed part of her California unfair-competition claim and dismissed her negligent-misrepresentation, unjust-enrichment, consumer-protection, false-advertising, and theft claims. Smith’s electronic-funds-transfer, unfair-competition unfairness, and conversion claims were not dismissed.
Judge Chesney granted in part and denied in part PlushCare’s motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the specified claims and gave the plaintiffs permission to file a third amended complaint by August 19, 2022, to correct the identified problems.
The detailed version
- Robbins v. PlushCare, Inc. · No. 3:21-cv-03444
- Maxine Chesney
- July 28, 2022
Background
Sarah Robbins and Tiffany Smith asserted eight causes of action based on allegations that the automatic-renewal terms on PlushCare’s website were not placed in visual proximity to the request for consent. PlushCare moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which concerns whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim, and Rule 9(b), which requires particularity for claims sounding in fraud.
Robbins’s Claims
The court held that Rule 12(g)(2) barred PlushCare from raising its failure-to-state-a-claim arguments against claims asserted on behalf of Robbins in this later motion. PlushCare had not shown that it was unable to raise those arguments when it moved against the first amended complaint. The court therefore denied the motion to the extent it addressed Robbins’s claims, without prejudice to PlushCare raising the failure-to-state-a-claim defense at a later stage.
Smith’s Claims
The court addressed Smith’s claims as follows:
- The First Cause of Action, under the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, was not challenged by PlushCare in this motion. - The Second Cause of Action, under California Business and Professions Code section 17200, was dismissed in part. The court dismissed the unlawful-prong claim insofar as it relied on California’s Automatic Renewal Law because Smith alleged that she was a consumer in Florida, while the law applies to consumers in California. The court did not dismiss the unfair-prong claim, finding that it was based on an alleged failure to fairly inform consumers of the terms they were accepting and did not sound in fraud. - The Third Cause of Action, for negligent misrepresentation, was dismissed because Smith did not allege a misrepresentation of a past or existing material fact or justifiable reliance. - The Fourth Cause of Action, titled unjust enrichment, was dismissed because unjust enrichment is not a cause of action or remedy under the authority discussed by the court. The court also found that Smith sought restitution through her section 17200 claim, making the unjust-enrichment claim duplicative. - The Fifth Cause of Action, under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, was dismissed. Smith did not identify particular false statements, allege that the statements were false when made, or allege detrimental reliance. - The Sixth Cause of Action, for false advertising, was dismissed. Smith did not identify a false statement on PlushCare’s website or allege reliance to her detriment. - The Seventh Cause of Action, titled theft under California Penal Code section 496, was dismissed because Smith did not allege facts showing that her property was stolen or obtained through theft, or that PlushCare knew it was stolen or so obtained. - The Eighth Cause of Action, for conversion, was not dismissed. The court found that Smith’s allegations that PlushCare charged recurring fees to her credit card without her consent could support an alleged wrongful deprivation of property rights.
Disposition
Judge Maxine M. Chesney concluded that PlushCare’s motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. The motion was granted as to the unlawful-prong portion of Smith’s Second Cause of Action and as to Smith’s Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action; those claims were dismissed. In all other respects, the motion was denied.
The court allowed the plaintiffs to file a Third Amended Complaint by August 19, 2022, to cure the identified deficiencies. If they did not amend, the action would proceed on the claims remaining in the second amended complaint, and PlushCare’s answer would be due by September 2, 2022.
Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.