Rumble, Inc. v. Google LLC

Background

Rumble alleged that Google violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by unlawfully acquiring or maintaining monopoly power in the online video-platform market. Rumble alleged that Google favored its YouTube platform in video-search results and used agreements with Android device manufacturers and distributors to require or encourage preinstallation, nondeletability, and prominent placement of YouTube and other Google applications. Rumble further alleged that these practices limited opportunities for rival video platforms, including Rumble.

Google filed a partial motion to dismiss and a motion to strike. It asked the court to dismiss Rumble’s tying and search-dominance theories and to strike paragraphs 34, 35, and 75 through 176 of the amended complaint. Rumble opposed both requests.

Motion to Dismiss

The court explained that a Section 2 monopolization claim requires allegations of monopoly power in a relevant market and willful acquisition or maintenance of that power, rather than power resulting from a superior product, business skill, or historical accident. Rumble defined the relevant market as the online video-platform market and alleged that YouTube controlled 73% of global online video activity.

The court stated that Rumble had adequately pleaded a Section 2 claim based on its allegations that Google designed its search algorithms to show YouTube links instead of competitors’ links. Google argued that the court should separate the single Section 2 claim into different theories—self-preferencing, tying YouTube to other Google applications, and using agreements to dominate the search market—and dismiss some of those theories.

The court declined to decide whether each alleged subtheory was independently viable. It found no controlling Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit authority supporting Google’s proposed approach and noted that antitrust plaintiffs should receive the full benefit of their proof without separating the factual components of their claim. The court therefore DENIED Google’s motion to dismiss.

Motion to Strike

Google also sought to strike allegations concerning the alleged conditioning of access to Google’s mobile operating system and other services on preinstallation of YouTube, including allegations that some agreements prohibited preinstallation of rival applications.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), a court may strike material that is insufficient, redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous. The court held that Google had not shown that the challenged allegations met that standard. Because the allegations could be relevant to the Section 2 claim, the court denied the motion to strike. The court emphasized that whether the allegations would ultimately be supported by enough evidence to survive summary judgment or be presented to a jury would be decided later.

Disposition

The court DENIED Google’s motion to dismiss and to strike. It also set a telephonic case-management conference for August 30, 2022.