Dixon v. Diaz

Background

Gregory J. Dixon, proceeding without a lawyer, brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officials concerning events at San Quentin State Prison. Dixon alleged that the defendants knowingly transferred 122 prisoners from the California Institute for Men, where there was a COVID-19 outbreak, to San Quentin on May 30, 2020, when San Quentin had no reported cases. He alleged that the defendants failed to test the transferred prisoners at an appropriate time and failed to quarantine them after arrival, causing an outbreak. Dixon alleged that he tested positive for the virus on July 6, 2020.

Dixon named Ralph Diaz, Kathleen Allison, Ron Davis, Ronald Broomfield, A. Pachynski, J. Arnold, Dean Borders, and Dr. Joseph Bink as defendants. He alleged that all defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his safety, violating the Eighth Amendment. He also asserted a claim under Article 1, section 17 of the California Constitution.

Screening and claims

Because Dixon was a prisoner seeking relief from government officials, the court conducted the required preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The court explained that screening requires dismissal of claims that are frivolous, malicious, inadequately pleaded, or seek money from an immune defendant. It also applied the rule that pleadings filed without a lawyer must be read liberally.

The court held that Dixon’s Eighth Amendment claim was cognizable when liberally construed. “Cognizable” here means that the allegations were sufficient for the claim to proceed past initial screening; the order did not decide whether Dixon would ultimately prevail.

The court dismissed Dixon’s California Constitution claim, concluding that Article 1, section 17 does not provide a private right of action for damages. The court ordered service of the complaint on all eight defendants through the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s electronic-service program, with further service by the United States Marshals Service for any defendant who did not waive service.

Motion for appointment of counsel and case management

The court denied Dixon’s motion for appointment of counsel. It stated that there is no right to appointed counsel in a civil case and that Dixon was able to adequately litigate his claims on his own. The order terminated the docket entry for that motion.

The court stated that it would issue a scheduling order for summary-judgment or other dispositive-motion briefing after resolution of common issues in the related matter identified as No. 22-mc-80066-WHO. The order also described Dixon’s responsibilities for prosecuting the case, serving communications on defense counsel, meeting deadlines, and reporting address changes.