Mackey v. Broomfield

Background

Terry Mackey, a state prisoner proceeding without a lawyer, filed a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officials and officers at San Quentin State Prison. He alleged that J. Dougery placed him in administrative segregation on December 23, 2021; Sanders approved the placement; and Tierney retained him there. Mackey further alleged that members of the Institutional Classification Committee retained him in segregation on December 30, 2021, and March 10, 2022, without allowing him to speak. He claimed that Willingham denied him a witness, failed to examine evidence, relied on Dougery’s report, and falsified the hearing results. Mackey also alleged that officials later released him from segregation, placed him in a 21-day quarantine, and falsified documents concerning the release date. He described additional conditions in segregation that he said violated the Eighth Amendment and sought a one-year credit toward his sentence, damages, and injunctive relief.

Screening and Legal Analysis

Because Mackey was a prisoner suing governmental actors, the court conducted the required preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of a constitutional or federal legal right by a person acting under state authority.

The court explained that due-process protections apply to prison disciplinary proceedings when the deprivation involves a liberty interest of real substance, such as an unusually severe hardship or action that inevitably affects the length of the sentence. It also described the procedural protections recognized in Wolff v. McDonnell, including notice of the charges, time to prepare, a written explanation of the decision, and—when compatible with institutional safety—the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence. The court held that Mackey’s allegations concerning the disciplinary hearings and his placement in administrative segregation were sufficient to state a due-process claim based on denial of those procedures.

The court separately ruled that Mackey could not obtain a one-year sentence credit through a § 1983 action. It stated that a prisoner seeking immediate or speedier release must use the remedy reserved for challenging the fact or duration of confinement, rather than a civil-rights action. The court therefore dismissed the sentence-credit claim for failure to state a claim for relief. It explained that an unfair hearing generally calls for another hearing; depending on the result of a rehearing, the available damages could be limited to nominal damages or could include compensatory damages.

Disposition and Next Steps

The order dismissed Mackey’s claim for a one-year credit to his sentence and stated that the case would proceed on the due-process claim against the defendants identified for service. The Clerk was directed to terminate San Quentin State Prison, R. Rosalez, Quach, and Taylor as parties because the complaint contained no allegations against them.

The court ordered service on O. Smith, L. Bravo, B. Martin, J. Dougery, S. Willingham, K. Andrade, Mitchell, M. Fitzgibbon, E. Sanders, and D. Tierney. It directed the defendants to file a summary-judgment motion or another dispositive motion within 91 days after the order was filed, and it set deadlines for Mackey’s opposition and the defendants’ reply. The order also allowed discovery under the applicable procedural rules and instructed Mackey about his responsibilities for prosecuting the case and keeping the court informed of address changes.

Judge Edward J. Davila’s order was a screening and case-management ruling. It did not decide whether Mackey would ultimately prevail on the due-process claim.