Brown v. The J.M. Smucker Company

Background

Molly Brown alleged that she was deceived into buying The J.M. Smucker Company’s products because the front labels overstated their protein content. She alleged that amino-acid content testing showed lower protein amounts than the packages advertised and that adjusting for digestibility using the Protein Digestibility Corrected Amino Acid Score would show even less usable protein. As an example, she alleged that a serving of Smucker’s Peanut Butter & Strawberry Uncrustables Sandwich was labeled as containing six grams of protein, while amino-acid testing showed five grams and the digestibility-adjusted amount was 2.5 grams.

Brown asserted claims under California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act, False Advertising Law, and Unfair Competition Law, as well as common-law fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment.

Legal standard

The defendant moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. The court also explained that fraud-based claims must describe the alleged misconduct in detail, including who made the statement, what was said, when and where it was said, and how it was false or misleading.

Discussion

The court first rejected the defendant’s argument that protein statements on the front of the packages were not nutrient-content claims. Because the statements repeated protein information that could appear in the Nutrition Facts panel, the court concluded that they were nutrient-content claims subject to federal regulations.

The court then relied on federal food-labeling regulations and Food and Drug Administration guidance. It concluded that those rules do not require protein statements on the front of a package to be based on amino-acid testing or adjusted for digestibility. The rules permit the nitrogen method or the protein-digestibility-corrected figure for calculating protein content.

The court held that Brown’s state-law theory would impose requirements that federal law does not impose. It therefore concluded that her claims were preempted, meaning that federal law barred the state-law requirements she sought to apply. The court did not reach the defendant’s standing arguments because it assumed Brown had standing and resolved the motion on another ground.

Disposition

Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court stated that the defect was in Brown’s legal theory rather than in the factual allegations, so it dismissed the claims without leave to amend. In its conclusion, the court granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice, directed the Clerk to close the case, and ordered entry of judgment in favor of the defendant.