Tournahu v. Flynn

Background

Pro se Plaintiff Melody Thornton moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the Petaluma Police Department. She said she no longer lived at the People’s Village and was camping in Petaluma. She asked the court to prevent the police from “harassing” her.

The court had previously allowed Defendants to abate the Steamer Landing Park encampment and required alternative housing offers to encampment residents. Thornton later became a resident of the People’s Village, a complex of non-congregate “tiny home” units. She stated that she was removed from her unit because trash and personal items were visible. She also stated that, before living there, Petaluma police had harassed her almost daily and that she feared future encounters after returning to the streets.

Thornton did not describe the conduct she considered harassment. The court treated her allegation as potentially including a threat of arrest and ordered Defendants to address whether she faced that risk. Defendants responded that the City and its community partner, COTS, had provided Thornton access to shelter on seven occasions between 2017 and 2022. They said she had been required to leave the People’s Village because of repeated rule violations, but remained eligible for COTS support services and might be eligible to return if she accepted the required support and services.

Defendants also said police routinely checked on unsheltered people and asked whether they would accept services or shelter. According to Defendants, officers generally ended the contact if a person was reluctant to engage. They stated that people camping in prohibited locations would generally be contacted, advised of shelter options, and asked to comply voluntarily; a citation could follow if they did not comply. They represented that arrest would occur only if violations continued or aggravating circumstances existed, such as outstanding warrants or serious safety risks.

Legal standard

A temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction requires a showing that the moving party is likely to succeed on the merits, likely to suffer irreparable harm without relief, that the balance of hardships favors relief, and that an injunction would serve the public interest. A party may alternatively proceed under a sliding-scale approach by showing serious questions on the merits, a likelihood of irreparable harm, a balance of hardships sharply favoring the party, and a public-interest benefit.

Court’s analysis

The court held that Thornton had not demonstrated likely irreparable harm under either approach. She did not explain what the earlier encounters with police involved, what harm she suffered, or what harm she expected in the future. The court concluded that police outreach and attempts to connect her with support services did not, on the record presented, establish likely irreparable harm.

The court also rejected the argument that Thornton was likely to suffer irreparable harm from arrest merely because she was unhoused. The City represented that it did not immediately arrest people who camped in prohibited locations and instead generally offered housing alternatives and issued citations when necessary. The court noted its observation of the City’s good-faith efforts in this and related litigation to connect unhoused people with service providers rather than proceed with citations or arrests.

The court further noted that the City had not stated whether camping was prohibited in every area of Petaluma, but Thornton had not argued or shown that adequate housing options were unavailable or that camping was prohibited everywhere in the city. The court stated that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Martin v. Boise may not apply if spaces exist where unhoused people can camp without sanctions, and found that Thornton had not shown that no such spaces existed. This omission also meant she had not raised a serious question on the merits under Martin.

Disposition

The court denied Plaintiff Thornton’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The order disposed of Docket No. 66.