Gomez v. Braby

Background

Andres Gomez filed a first amended complaint alleging that he is legally blind and uses screen-reader software to read internet content. He alleged that Elizabeth Ann Braby owns or operates Corcoran Global Living, a real-estate business located in Napa Valley, and that its website contained accessibility barriers. The alleged barriers included the absence of a way to make the site fully readable by screen-reader software, inaccessible content and input fields, images without readable text equivalents, and low color contrast.

Gomez alleged that he was a prospective customer, visited the website to obtain information about homes for sale in Northern California, and was denied full and equal access because of the alleged barriers. He also alleged that he was deterred from using the website but would return once it was represented to be fully accessible. He asserted claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Braby filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which challenges the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Gomez did not file an opposition by the response deadline, and Braby did not file a reply.

ADA Standing

The court explained that an ADA plaintiff must show that he is disabled under the statute, that the defendant owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation, and that the defendant denied him access because of his disability. For a website-accessibility claim, Ninth Circuit law requires a connection, or “nexus,” between the inaccessible website and the plaintiff’s ability to access services at a physical location that qualifies as a public accommodation.

The court held that Gomez had not alleged that connection. Although he alleged that he visited Braby’s website to obtain information about homes for sale, he did not allege that he intended to use Braby’s real-estate services, including purchasing a home. The court therefore concluded that he had not alleged an injury sufficient for standing.

The court also relied on Gomez’s declaration in another case that he enjoyed “window shopping” on real-estate websites but did not presently intend to buy a specific property at a specific time. The court stated that Gomez’s current allegations about deterrence or intent to return would likely conflict with his prior testimony and declarations, including statements that he did not have a present interest in purchasing a home in Napa Valley.

Unruh Act Claim and Amendment

The court addressed Braby’s request to dismiss the Unruh Act claim on the same factual basis. It stated that courts in the district had declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—authority to hear related state-law claims—after dismissing a parallel ADA claim because doing so would not further judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

The court also considered whether Gomez should be allowed to amend his complaint. Because Gomez did not oppose the motion or request permission to amend, and because the court found that any amendment would be futile, it dismissed the first amended complaint without leave to amend.

Disposition

Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton granted Braby’s motion to dismiss. The ADA claim was dismissed for lack of standing, the court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim, and the first amended complaint was dismissed without leave to amend.