Drevaleva v. Ng

Background

Tatyana Evgenievna Drevaleva, proceeding without a lawyer, sued the California Department of Industrial Relations, its Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, attorney Doris Ng, investigators Catherine Daly and Bobit Santos, supervisor Joan Healy, and Assistant Chief Eric Rood. The defendants were sued in various official and individual capacities.

Drevaleva alleged that Alameda Health System terminated her in 2013 and that the labor-enforcement defendants improperly handled her retaliation-related administrative grievance. Her complaint asserted 16 federal and state claims, including discrimination, claims under federal civil-rights statutes, conspiracy, fraud, harassment, emotional distress, interference with prospective economic advantage, loss of consortium, racketeering, slavery under the Thirteenth Amendment, and cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. She sought reinstatement to her job and $250 million from each of Ng, the Department of Industrial Relations, and the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement.

The defendants moved to dismiss the entire complaint based on claim preclusion, Eleventh Amendment immunity, California statutory immunities and privileges, failure to state a claim, and defective service on Daly and Santos. Drevaleva’s opposition addressed only Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court treated her failure to address the other grounds as a concession of those grounds supporting dismissal.

Reasons for Dismissal

The court dismissed all claims against the Department of Industrial Relations and the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement without leave to amend. It held that the Eleventh Amendment generally bars suits against a state and extends that protection to state agencies. The court found that both agencies were state agencies and that California had not waived its immunity.

The court also dismissed all claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities without leave to amend. It ruled that the Eleventh Amendment barred damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities. Although prospective relief can sometimes be sought against a state official for an ongoing violation of federal law, the court concluded that Drevaleva’s requested reinstatement to work at Alameda Health System did not support such relief against these defendants.

The court dismissed all claims against the individual Division of Labor Standards Enforcement defendants with prejudice under claim preclusion. Claim preclusion prevents a later case from pursuing claims that were raised or could have been raised in an earlier case. The court found the required connection between the parties, that the claims concerned the same handling of Drevaleva’s labor complaints, and that the earlier related case ended in a final judgment on the merits.

The court dismissed all claims against Ng with prejudice. It found Drevaleva’s federal claims against Ng legally unsupported: filing motions and making arguments in court filings was not racketeering activity, the alleged conduct did not constitute slavery under the Thirteenth Amendment, and Ng did not punish Drevaleva for a criminal conviction in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Because no viable federal claim remained against Ng, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims against her.

The court concluded that the pleading could not be cured by adding other facts and should be dismissed without leave to amend.

Motion to Disqualify

Drevaleva filed an affidavit seeking to disqualify the undersigned judge under 28 U.S.C. § 144. The court said the motion could be denied because it was filed after an order temporarily halting new motions. It also held that the affidavit was legally insufficient because it did not allege prejudice arising from an outside source. The court explained that a judge’s earlier unfavorable rulings are not enough to require disqualification and denied the motion.

Other Motions and Disposition

Because the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice, it denied as moot Drevaleva’s motions concerning orders involving the Department of Industrial Relations, her application seeking the addresses of Daly and Santos, and her applications seeking permission to request a default judgment against Ng.

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice, denied Drevaleva’s motion to disqualify, and denied the remaining pending motions as moot. It instructed the clerk to enter judgment and close the case.