Smith v. Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc
- Charles Breyer
- 3:20-cv-05451
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 7
In Smith v. Walgreens Boots Alliance, Judge Breyer granted Walgreens’ dismissal motion with prejudice and denied or denied as moot the other motions.
Susan Smith’s claims against Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., and the other defendants were dismissed with prejudice. The order also denied the parties’ sanctions motions and denied Smith’s motion to strike and Walgreens’ personal-jurisdiction motion as moot.
What happened
Susan Smith sued Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., and others in a nationwide class action, alleging that Walgreens’ opioid-prescription practices discriminated against disabled people. She claimed Walgreens discouraged pharmacists from filling prescriptions above certain dosage and duration levels.
Smith brought claims based on facial discrimination, unequal effects on disabled people, and failure to provide reasonable changes to Walgreens’ practices. The court also addressed related claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Affordable Care Act, and California’s Unruh Act.
Judge Charles R. Breyer ruled that none of the claims was plausibly stated because the alleged policy applied to everyone seeking prescriptions above the thresholds, not uniquely to disabled people. The court granted Walgreens’ motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint with prejudice, denied Smith’s motion to strike as moot, denied both parties’ sanctions motions, and denied Walgreens’ personal-jurisdiction motion as moot.
The detailed version
- Smith v. Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc · No. 3:20-cv-05451
- Charles Breyer
- Sept. 9, 2022
Background
Susan Smith brought a nationwide class action against Walgreens, alleging that its policy for dispensing prescription opioids discriminated against disabled people. The court had previously granted Walgreens’ motions to dismiss twice. Walgreens moved to dismiss Smith’s Third Amended Complaint, whose allegations generally mirrored those in the Second Amended Complaint.
Smith alleged that Walgreens used the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s opioid-prescribing guidelines to create a policy discouraging pharmacists from filling prescriptions exceeding 90 morphine milligram equivalents or seven days. According to the complaint, the policy allegedly pressured or instructed pharmacists to refuse, partially fill, or otherwise burden those prescriptions, even though the policy did not make filling them impossible. Smith alleged that people receiving prescriptions above those thresholds were highly likely to be disabled.
Legal standard
The court applied Rule 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally recognized claim supported by enough facts to make liability plausible. The court treated Smith’s claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Affordable Care Act, and the Unruh Act under the same analysis.
Facial and proxy discrimination
The court rejected Smith’s claim that Walgreens’ policy facially discriminated against disabled people. A facially discriminatory policy expressly applies based on disability. The alleged trigger here was an opioid prescription exceeding the dosage and duration thresholds, not a person’s disability, and Smith alleged that the policy applied to disabled and nondisabled customers alike.
The court also rejected the theory that the thresholds were a proxy for disability. A neutral criterion can operate as a proxy only when it is so closely associated with the disfavored group that using the criterion effectively amounts to discrimination against that group. The studies Smith cited did not provide enough detail about the relationship between disability and prescriptions exceeding the thresholds. The court found that her broader assertions were not sufficient factual allegations, particularly after multiple opportunities to amend.
Disparate impact
The court held that Smith did not plausibly allege that the policy had a discriminatory effect on disabled people. A neutral policy may support an unequal-effects claim when it denies disabled people meaningful access to a service that remains open and easily accessible to others. But the alleged Walgreens policy applied to every customer seeking to fill a prescription exceeding the thresholds. Smith did not plausibly allege that disabled customers faced unique burdens or that the service remained meaningfully accessible to nondisabled customers while being inaccessible to disabled customers.
Reasonable modification
The court also rejected Smith’s claim that Walgreens failed to provide a reasonable modification. Such a claim requires facts showing that the requested modification was reasonable and necessary to accommodate a disability. The court reasoned that, under Smith’s allegations, both disabled and nondisabled customers seeking prescriptions above the thresholds could face refusal, partial filling, or additional requirements. Because both groups allegedly had the same experience, Smith did not plausibly allege that a modification was necessary to give disabled customers an experience comparable to that of nondisabled customers.
Disposition
The court granted Walgreens’ motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint with prejudice. The court denied Smith’s motion to strike as moot because the order did not rely on the Good Faith Dispensing Policies. It denied the parties’ motions for sanctions because neither party established sanctionable conduct. It also denied Walgreens’ separate motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction as moot.
Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.