Maschmeier v. United States of America

Background

The plaintiffs—identified in the opinion as the mother, father, and grandmother of a deceased newborn—brought claims against the United States, a medical center, and medical staff. The claims included wrongful death, described as professional negligence or medical malpractice; negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) involving the mother as a direct victim; NIED involving the father and grandmother as bystanders; medical and related expenses as part of a survival action; and loss of consortium.

The complaint alleged that the mother arrived at the hospital at 41 weeks of pregnancy after experiencing decreased fetal movement. Labor was induced with Cervidil. The plaintiffs alleged that the mother experienced excessive contractions and abnormal fetal heart-rate decelerations, but the medication was not stopped and the newborn was not urgently delivered. They also alleged delays in taking the mother to the operating room for a cesarean section. The newborn was delivered alive with the umbilical cord around her neck and died after 37 minutes of attempted resuscitation.

The United States moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. It argued that the mother’s separate NIED claim was improper because it was part of the professional-negligence claim, and that the father and grandmother had not alleged the contemporaneous sensory awareness required for bystander NIED under California law. The plaintiffs conceded the point about the mother’s separate claim and asked to move those allegations into the first cause of action. They also conceded that prejudgment interest was unavailable under the Federal Tort Claims Act.

Court’s analysis

For a bystander NIED claim, California law requires allegations that the plaintiff was near the accident, was directly shocked by witnessing it, and was closely related to the injured person. The plaintiff must have contemporaneously perceived the injury-producing event, rather than learning about the injury afterward. The court explained that merely observing medical procedures, emergency measures, medical staff’s concern, irregular fetal heart tones, or the announcement of death is not necessarily enough when the injury-producing event is medical negligence that a layperson could not perceive as it occurred.

The complaint alleged that the father and grandmother were present during labor and delivery, knew about fetal distress, observed abnormal heart-rate readings and nurses’ concern, and saw efforts to resuscitate the newborn. But the court found that the complaint did not allege that they understood, while it was happening, that a specific medical intervention or omission—such as administering Cervidil, performing the cesarean section, or attempting resuscitation—was the event that caused the newborn’s injuries. The court also noted that the complaint did not allege that they were present during or at the end of the 37-minute resuscitation. The court therefore concluded that the complaint did not adequately plead contemporaneous awareness of the injury-producing accident.

Disposition

The court stated that the United States’ motion to dismiss was GRANTED. The plaintiffs’ bystander NIED claims were DISMISSED with leave to amend, and the plaintiffs were given 21 days from the order’s date to file an amended complaint if they chose to do so. The request to move the mother’s NIED allegations into the medical-negligence claim was GRANTED. The request for prejudgment interest was STRICKEN. The plaintiffs’ request to consolidate or transfer the state-court action was DENIED; the court said it could consider coordination efforts when setting the case-management order.