Maynard v. United Services Automobile Association Federal Savings Bank

Background

The case concerns the repossession of Maynard’s 2014 Dodge Durango. Maynard used the vehicle as collateral to refinance a loan with United Services Automobile Association Federal Savings Bank. He alleged that the vehicle’s outstanding balance of $27,644.02 was discharged in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding on January 7, 2020.

Maynard alleged that he received notice of an intended repossession on January 15, 2020. He said he surrendered the Durango to the bank’s agents on February 11, 2020, but the vehicle was not repossessed at that time. A towing company later towed it from a parking lot, and Maynard alleged that he bought it at a lien sale around June 16, 2020. He further alleged that the bank repossessed the vehicle from his home around November 30, 2020, and that he recovered it on December 2, 2020.

The court had previously allowed Maynard to add claims under the Rosenthal Act, denied permission to add a claim under California Commercial Code section 9609(b)(2), and dismissed his proposed claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court had not addressed his proposed contempt claim. Maynard then sought permission to file a motion asking the court to reconsider its treatment of those claims.

Motion to Strike

The bank moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) to strike the last sentence of paragraph 3 of Maynard’s Second Amended Complaint. The sentence asserted that Maynard had an additional claim concerning the bank’s alleged bad-faith insurance dealings and cancellation of his membership in 2019, which he might bring in a separate lawsuit.

The court held that the sentence was unrelated to Maynard’s current repossession claims and could confuse the issues. Maynard conceded that the sentence was irrelevant and immaterial to the case. The court therefore granted the bank’s motion to strike.

Motion to Dismiss the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Claim

The bank moved under Rule 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. Maynard’s claim arose under 15 U.S.C. § 1692d, which prohibits a debt collector from engaging in conduct whose natural consequence is to harass, oppress, or abuse someone in connection with collecting a debt.

The court explained that examples of potentially unlawful conduct include threats, obscene or profane language, repeated harassing calls, and calls that do not identify the caller. It concluded that Maynard had not alleged enough specific facts to make a plausible claim. His allegations that the bank negligently misrepresented its status as a lien holder, attempted to steal his property, and acted dismissively and abhorrently during a telephone call were treated as conclusory statements rather than facts showing harassment, oppression, or abuse.

Because Maynard had already amended his complaint twice, the court found no good cause to allow another amendment. It granted the bank’s motion to dismiss the Section 1692d claim without leave to amend.

Request to Seek Reconsideration

Maynard sought permission to file a motion for reconsideration of the previously dismissed intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. Reconsideration is permission to ask the court to revisit an earlier ruling based on specified circumstances, such as previously unavailable material facts or law, new material facts or a change in law, or a failure to consider material facts or decisive legal arguments.

The court concluded that Maynard had not alleged facts showing conduct beyond all possible bounds of decency or emotional distress of the severe quality required for an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. It also found that he had not identified any ground permitting reconsideration under the applicable local rule. The court denied his motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration on that claim.

Maynard also sought reconsideration concerning his proposed contempt claim, arguing that the court had not previously addressed it. The court explained that contempt is a power courts may use to address disobedience of judicial orders, exercised with restraint and discretion, and that contempt is not a separate cause of action. The court denied Maynard’s motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration on the contempt claim.

Disposition

The court granted the bank’s motion to strike, granted the bank’s motion to dismiss the claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692d, and denied Maynard’s motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration.