Doe v. Uber Technologies, Inc.
- Jacquelyn Corley
- 3:19-cv-03310
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 9
In Doe v. Uber, Judge Corley granted Uber’s summary-judgment motion, ruling California law imposed no duty of care for the assault.
Jane Doe’s negligence claim against Uber Technologies, Inc., Rasier, LLC, and Rasier CA, LLC was resolved in Uber’s favor. The order also granted Doe’s request to seal specified redactions in her opposition brief and exhibits.
What happened
Jane Doe sued Uber Technologies, Inc., and its wholly owned subsidiaries over an assault by a former Uber driver who posed as a current driver. The driver had been deactivated after two sexual-assault complaints but used an Uber decal to pick up Doe.
The court ruled that Uber did not owe Doe a legal duty to protect her from the driver’s criminal acts. It rejected her arguments that Uber had a special relationship with her or had increased the risk through its handling of the driver, decals, rider-safety information, and rides ordered for people without working phones.
The court granted Uber’s motion for summary judgment, ending Doe’s negligence claim, and separately granted her motion to seal certain redactions. Judge Jacquelyn Scott Corley said the court would enter judgment by a separate order.
The detailed version
- Doe v. Uber Technologies, Inc. · No. 3:19-cv-03310
- Jacquelyn Corley
- Sept. 15, 2022
Background
Jane Doe brought a negligence claim against Uber Technologies, Inc., and its wholly owned subsidiaries Rasier, LLC and Rasier CA, LLC. The claim arose from an August 18, 2018 assault by Brandon Sherman, a former Uber driver who posed as a current Uber driver. Sherman had been deactivated from Uber’s platform two months earlier after two separate complaints that he had sexually assaulted passengers.
Doe entered Sherman’s vehicle believing it was the Uber ride her boyfriend had ordered for her. Sherman drove her to a remote location, raped and strangled her, and was later arrested, convicted of kidnapping, strangulation, and witness intimidation, and sentenced to 11 years in prison.
The court had previously dismissed Doe’s claims based on ostensible agency and common-carrier negligence but allowed her negligence claim to proceed under a misfeasance theory. Misfeasance, as discussed by the court, concerns conduct that creates or increases a risk of harm. Uber later moved for summary judgment, arguing that California law barred Doe’s negligence claim.
Court’s Analysis
The court held that the negligence claim failed because Uber did not owe Doe a duty of care. Under California law, a negligence claim requires a duty of care, a breach, and causation. The court treated the duty question as dispositive and therefore did not analyze the other negligence elements.
California generally does not require a person or business to protect others from criminal acts by third parties. The court identified two relevant exceptions: a special relationship that creates an affirmative duty to protect, and misfeasance, where the defendant’s conduct creates or increases the risk of harm.
The court rejected Doe’s argument that she had a special relationship with Uber as an Uber rider, guest, or invitee. It relied on a California appellate decision involving similar allegations that Uber riders were assaulted by people posing as Uber drivers. That decision held that Uber was not in a special relationship with the riders that created a duty to protect them from third-party assaults.
The court also rejected Doe’s four misfeasance theories: that Uber failed to retrieve its decal from Sherman after terminating him; shielded Sherman from criminal investigation and prosecution; failed to provide riders with tools to protect themselves despite knowing about assaults; and allowed people to request rides for others who did not have working phones.
The court concluded that these theories did not show that Sherman’s criminal conduct was a necessary component of Uber’s business or that Uber stimulated that conduct. The court explained that creating an opportunity for criminal conduct, even if the conduct is foreseeable, does not by itself constitute misfeasance. It also noted that Uber had terminated Sherman from the platform after the second complaint and that allowing rides to be ordered for other people did not encourage or relate to Sherman’s criminal conduct.
Because the case was in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, the court applied California law and followed the California appellate decision addressing the same general duty question. The court found no convincing evidence that the California Supreme Court would reject that decision’s reasoning.
Disposition
The court GRANTED Uber’s motion for summary judgment. It ruled that, as a matter of law, Uber did not owe Doe a duty of care and was entitled to judgment in its favor on her negligence claim.
The court also granted Doe’s second motion to file under seal portions of her opposition brief and related exhibits, but only as to the redactions identified in Uber’s supporting declaration. The order states that it disposes of Docket Nos. 220, 231, and 236, and that judgment would be entered by separate order.
Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.