Demacedo v. Koenig

Background

Denis Demacedo, identified as a California state prisoner, filed a petition for federal relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A jury had convicted him of three counts of second-degree murder, three counts of gross vehicular manslaughter, two driving-under-the-influence offenses involving bodily injury, leaving the scene of a vehicular accident causing property damage, and perjury. The state trial court sentenced him to 47 years and two months to life in prison.

The petition raised five grounds: exclusion of defense expert Dr. Alan Donelson’s proposed testimony about the probability of a fatal crash caused by drunk driving; admission of evidence concerning Demacedo’s prior driving-under-the-influence conviction, prior car accident, and participation in a first-offender program; admission of hearsay in prosecution expert testimony; improper sentencing and an unconstitutionally disproportionate sentence; and cumulative error.

Legal standard

For claims that a state court decided on the merits, the federal court could grant relief only if the state decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court also applied the rule that a state procedural ground that is independent and adequate to support the judgment can bar federal review unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Defense expert testimony

Demacedo argued that excluding Dr. Donelson’s testimony violated due process and his right to present a complete defense. The proposed testimony relied on general National Highway Traffic Safety Administration statistics and would have addressed whether drunk driving generally created a high probability of a fatal crash. The state appellate court concluded that the testimony was minimally relevant and potentially misleading because it did not account for the specific facts of Demacedo’s driving, including his speed, blood-alcohol level, and driving pattern.

The court denied relief on this claim. It concluded that the state court’s failure to apply a Ninth Circuit balancing test did not violate the federal habeas standard because the United States Supreme Court had not clearly established that test for this issue. The court also concluded that Demacedo had not shown that excluding the testimony had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. The court noted that other evidence addressed whether Demacedo acted with implied malice, including evidence of his distress and remorse and testimony that he braked and swerved to avoid the accident.

Prior-acts evidence

Demacedo challenged the admission of evidence about his 2010 driving-under-the-influence conviction and first-offender-program participation, as well as a collision 18 days before the fatal crash. The state appellate court held that the evidence was relevant to whether Demacedo knew the dangers of drunk and reckless driving and knew he was required to stop after an accident. It also found the evidence was not unduly prejudicial and noted that the jury was instructed not to use it as proof of bad character or a criminal disposition.

The court denied relief on this claim. It explained that a state-law evidentiary error is not enough for federal habeas relief. Relief would require a violation of due process, and the Supreme Court had not clearly established that admission of irrelevant, prejudicial, or propensity evidence necessarily violates due process. The court further concluded that the evidence had permissible uses and did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.

Hearsay and confrontation claim

The prosecution’s expert, Rudy Degger, testified about another expert’s out-of-court analysis of Demacedo’s speed and acceleration. The state appellate court and the prosecution agreed that this testimony was hearsay under state law. The state court nevertheless concluded that the testimony did not violate the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause because the other expert, Craig Fries, later testified and Demacedo had an opportunity to cross-examine him. The state court also held that any error was harmless.

The court denied relief on this claim. It concluded that Demacedo had not shown that the state court unreasonably applied federal law in finding no Confrontation Clause violation. It alternatively held that the state court’s harmless-error analysis was reasonable and that Demacedo had not shown prejudice under the federal standard.

Sentencing claim

Demacedo argued that the trial court improperly applied sentencing criteria, abused its discretion by imposing consecutive murder terms, and imposed an excessive and disproportionate sentence. He did not object to the sentence or the court’s stated reasons during the sentencing hearing. The state appellate court held that these arguments were forfeited because Demacedo had not raised them in the trial court.

The court denied relief on this claim without reaching the underlying sentencing arguments. It held that the state court’s forfeiture ruling was an independent and adequate state-law ground for the judgment. Demacedo did not establish cause for the default, actual prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice that would permit federal review.

Cumulative error

Demacedo argued that the combined effect of the alleged errors denied him a fair trial. The court denied relief on this claim. It explained that the state court had reasonably treated the hearsay issue as a nonprejudicial state-law error and had implicitly concluded that there were no constitutional errors to combine into a constitutional violation.

Disposition

The court denied the habeas petition. It also denied a certificate of appealability, concluding that Demacedo had not made the required substantial showing that a constitutional right had been denied.