Harrington III v. Pinterest, Inc.

Background

Blaine Harrington III alleged that he is the sole copyright owner of his photographs and that he embeds information identifying and protecting those works in the image files. That information includes the creator, copyright notice, credit source, descriptions, and other usage information. The opinion describes this embedded information as copyright management information, or CMI, under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).

Pinterest operates a platform where users upload and share images. Harrington alleged that Pinterest removed visible copyright information and embedded metadata from images, including his photographs, before displaying and distributing them. He also alleged that Pinterest used images in targeted advertising and that Pinterest had stopped preserving the relevant metadata before later resuming that practice in 2021.

The ruling concerned only the second cause of action in Harrington’s second amended complaint: the DMCA claim under 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b). The court had previously dismissed the claim with leave to amend because Harrington had not adequately alleged Pinterest’s required knowledge. Harrington then filed the second amended complaint, and Pinterest filed another motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which addresses whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim.

Legal standard

At the pleading stage, the court generally accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and views reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. But the complaint must contain enough factual matter to make the claim plausible rather than merely possible or speculative. Leave to amend generally must be allowed unless the pleading could not possibly be corrected with additional facts.

Court’s analysis

Section 1202(b)(1) prohibits intentionally removing or altering CMI while knowing, or having reasonable grounds to know, that the conduct will induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal copyright infringement. Section 1202(b)(3) addresses distributing works with knowledge that CMI was removed or altered and with knowledge, or reasonable grounds to know, that the distribution will have those effects. The court explained that these provisions require two relevant forms of knowledge: knowledge that CMI was removed or altered, and knowledge that the conduct would aid infringement.

The court found the first requirement inadequately pleaded. Harrington did not allege that Pinterest knew any particular work was on its platform or that a particular work contained CMI when uploaded. The allegation that Pinterest removed “any metadata” was insufficient because metadata and CMI are not identical; metadata may contain CMI, but does not necessarily do so. Without facts connecting Pinterest’s conduct to CMI in Harrington’s particular works, the court could not reasonably infer intentional removal or actual knowledge that CMI had been removed.

The court separately found the second knowledge requirement inadequately pleaded. Although Harrington alleged that he used IPTC metadata to identify and enforce his copyrights, he did not allege facts showing that Pinterest knew about those practices. The court said that general allegations that removing CMI makes copyright enforcement more difficult did not identify how particular infringements would be affected or show a relevant pattern of conduct known to Pinterest.

The court also rejected Harrington’s reliance on Pinterest’s alleged advertising motives, its changes in metadata practices, and statements made in a discovery dispute in a prior related proceeding. The court found the advertising allegations unsupported, concluded that Pinterest’s later resumption of metadata preservation did not establish its earlier state of mind, and determined that the discovery response did not mention CMI or IPTC metadata. Pinterest’s display of some visible CMI and links to original image sources also did not establish the required knowledge as to Harrington’s works, but the court held that the pleading deficiencies independently required dismissal.

Disposition

The court granted Pinterest’s motion to dismiss the second cause of action. It dismissed that cause of action with leave to amend because the deficiencies might be cured by additional factual allegations. The court did not set a deadline for a third amended complaint because the parties had stipulated to stay the case schedule while an appeal in a prior related proceeding was resolved. The clerk was directed to administratively close the file, and the parties were ordered to notify the court within one week after that appeal was resolved.

Classification

This is a procedural order because the court dismissed the claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for insufficient pleading and did not decide whether Pinterest actually violated the DMCA.