Lee v. Allison

Background

The order applies to seven related cases, including Lee v. Allison, brought by unrepresented plaintiffs. The plaintiffs alleged that transferring prisoners from CIM to SQSP, along with the transfer protocols, testing, and housing arrangements, caused a COVID-19 outbreak and their resulting illnesses. The court received a limited assignment to resolve common issues concerning Clark Kelso's immunity, immunity under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, qualified immunity, and whether the complaints adequately stated claims.

PREP Act and qualified immunity

The court had previously held in cases involving represented plaintiffs that the pleadings and judicially noticeable facts adequately alleged claims and that neither Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act immunity nor qualified immunity prevented the claims from proceeding at the motion-to-dismiss stage. In these related cases, the court ordered defendants to show cause—meaning to explain why the court should not reach the same conclusion. Defendants could incorporate their prior arguments or raise new arguments based on case-specific facts. The court stated that a later order would resolve these assigned issues.

Kelso's immunity

The court found that federal Receiver J. Clark Kelso has quasi-judicial immunity. It explained that the receiver for California's prison medical-care system was appointed by a federal court and given the same immunities as that court, and that Kelso later received the receiver's powers and responsibilities. The court relied on prior decisions recognizing immunity for Kelso and court-appointed receivers. It stated that the plaintiffs did not allege, and based on their other allegations could not allege, that Kelso acted outside his appointed capacity or in the complete absence of jurisdiction.

The court stated that it intended to dismiss Kelso from the assigned cases with prejudice. It allowed pro se plaintiffs until October 18, 2022, to object. If no plaintiff objected by that date, Kelso would be dismissed with prejudice; if a plaintiff objected, Kelso could respond by November 8. Paul David Johnson's motion for summary judgment concerning Kelso's liability was denied as premature.

Failure to state a claim

The court rejected the defendants' failure-to-state-a-claim arguments made before the limited assignment. Under the pleading standard, a complaint must provide a legally recognized theory and enough factual detail to make liability plausible. For an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison conditions, a plaintiff must allege an objectively serious risk or medical need and that officials knew of and disregarded the risk.

The court concluded that the complaints could adequately allege that defendants participated in, facilitated, or knew about the prisoner-transfer decisions or protocols and failed to reduce the resulting risk. The plaintiffs did not need to allege that defendants knew of the risk to each individual plaintiff; allegations that defendants knew of the risk to San Quentin prisoners could be enough. The court also concluded that causation questions—including whether other events interrupted the connection between the transfer and the infections—could not be resolved at the motion-to-dismiss stage. The plaintiffs likewise did not need to allege specifically that each had been housed with or had contact with transferred prisoners if their allegations plausibly connected the transfer and related procedures to the outbreak and their illnesses.

The court therefore ordered defendants to show cause why its conclusion that the pro se plaintiffs adequately stated their claims was mistaken. Defendants had until October 4, 2022, to respond, and plaintiffs could respond by November 8 to issues raised by defendants. The order terminated Docket Nos. 58 and 75.