Keene v. City and County of San Francisco
- Jeffrey White
- 4:22-cv-01587
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 7
In Keene v. City and County of San Francisco, Judge White dismissed official-capacity claims against two officials and denied plaintiffs’ preliminary-injunction motion.
Selina Keene and Melody Fountila’s claims against Mayor London Breed and Carol Isen in their official capacities were dismissed; their request to block the City’s vaccination mandate through a preliminary injunction was denied. The order does not dismiss the City and County of San Francisco from the case.
What happened
Keene v. City and County of San Francisco concerns Selina Keene and Melody Fountila’s challenge to San Francisco’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement for City employees. They alleged that the requirement conflicted with their religious beliefs and violated federal and California employment-discrimination laws.
The court granted the motion to dismiss London Breed and Carol Isen from the case because suing them in their official capacities duplicated the claims against the City and County of San Francisco. The court did not dismiss the City from the case in this order.
The court also denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, concluding that they had not shown likely success, irreparable harm, or that the balance of interests and public interest favored an injunction. Judge White issued the order.
The detailed version
- Keene v. City and County of San Francisco · No. 4:22-cv-01587
- Jeffrey White
- Sept. 23, 2022
Background
Selina Keene and Melody Fountila, identified as City workers, sued the City and County of San Francisco, Mayor London Breed, and Carol Isen, the City’s Director of Human Resources. They sued Breed and Isen in their official capacities.
The plaintiffs alleged that the City required its employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19 by November 1, 2021. They said they refused vaccination because they believed the vaccines conflicted with their religious beliefs and because they believed their naturally acquired immunity was sufficient. The opinion states that, after they did not comply with the mandate, they left their employment.
The plaintiffs claimed that the vaccination program violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act by failing to accommodate their religious beliefs or practices.
Motion to Dismiss the Individual Defendants
The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. They argued that including Breed and Isen as defendants in their official capacities was unnecessary and duplicated the claims against the City and County.
The court agreed. It explained that an official-capacity lawsuit against a municipal officer is equivalent to a lawsuit against the municipality itself. Because the City and County was already a defendant, the court found the claims against Breed and Isen duplicative.
The court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the individual defendants Breed and Isen sued in their official capacities. The order does not state that the City and County’s claims were dismissed.
Preliminary Injunction
A preliminary injunction is an order issued early in a case to preserve the situation while the case continues. The court applied the factors requiring a plaintiff to show a likelihood of success or serious questions on the merits, likely irreparable harm without an injunction, a favorable balance of hardships, and consistency with the public interest.
The court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. It concluded that the plaintiffs had not shown that they were likely to prevail on their religious-discrimination claims. The court rejected their assertions that the vaccines were derived from fetal cells or were merely ineffective treatments, relying on materials cited in the opinion and on precedent recognizing compulsory vaccination as a condition of employment.
The court also found that the plaintiffs had not shown sincere religious beliefs conflicting with vaccination. It stated that personal preferences or philosophical views are not religious beliefs protected by Title VII or the Fair Employment and Housing Act.
The court further concluded that loss of employment did not constitute irreparable harm for purposes of a preliminary injunction. Finally, it found that the public interest in preventing the spread of COVID-19 through increased vaccination rates outweighed the plaintiffs’ asserted harms.
Disposition
The court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the individuals in their official capacities and denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. It also set an initial case-management conference for November 4, 2022, and required a joint case-management statement by October 28, 2022.
Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.