Lizarraga-Davis v. Transworld Systems Inc.

Background

Transworld Systems Inc. asked the court to reconsider its earlier order granting Oskar Lizarraga-Davis’s motion for partial summary judgment on liability and denying Transworld’s motion for summary judgment. The motion relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and Civil Local Rule 7-9. Lizarraga-Davis opposed the motion. The court decided the motion without oral argument.

The earlier order had excluded a redacted excerpt of Schedule 1 under Rule 37(c)(1) because Transworld had not produced it during discovery and had not shown that its failure was substantially justified or harmless. The court had also excluded a roster as hearsay because it did not qualify for the business-records exception.

Legal standard

Rule 54(b) allows a court to revise an order deciding fewer than all claims or parties before final judgment. Under Civil Local Rule 7-9(b), reconsideration generally requires a material difference in fact or law that could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence, newly emerging material facts or a change in law, or a manifest failure to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments previously presented.

Analysis

Transworld first argued that the two documents were admissible originals of electronically stored information. The court treated this as an argument based on a material difference in fact or law, but found that Transworld had not shown that it could not have made the argument earlier with reasonable diligence. The court therefore found no basis for reconsideration.

Transworld next argued that, even if the documents themselves were inadmissible, their information could be presented in an admissible form at trial. The court explained that this argument could not overcome the discovery sanction applicable to the redacted excerpt of Schedule 1. Because Transworld could not use that information on a motion or at trial, the information could not be considered on summary judgment. As to the roster, Transworld had not shown how its information could be presented in admissible form. Its specific suggestion—that witnesses could authenticate the roster—did not address the reason the court had excluded it, which was hearsay rather than lack of authentication. Transworld also had not shown that it could not have raised this argument earlier.

Transworld further argued that the documents were non-hearsay because they were offered to prove their existence rather than the truth of their contents. The court found that this argument had not previously been presented and that Transworld had not shown the required diligence. The court also found the argument lacked merit as to the roster because Transworld offered it to show that its principal acquired Lizarraga-Davis’s student loan and had adequate documentation of that acquisition. That use depended on the truth of the loan information summarized in the roster.

Finally, Transworld argued that the court could use its inherent authority to reconsider the earlier order even if Civil Local Rule 7-9(b) was not satisfied. The court recognized that authority but found no newly discovered evidence, clear error, manifest injustice, or intervening change in controlling law. It also stated that Transworld’s belated presentation of arguments it could have made earlier did not justify reconsideration.

Order

Judge Beth Labson Freeman denied Transworld’s motion for reconsideration. The order terminated ECF 80.