Lloyd v. Facebook, Inc.

Background

Susan Lloyd, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Facebook, Inc., Meta Platforms Inc., and Mark Zuckerberg. Lloyd alleged that she has severe vision issues and that Facebook’s platform was inaccessible to people with vision impairments and people with no arms. She identified problems involving font size, screen orientation, color contrast, text resizing, form labels and error notices, disabling videos and animated images, language options, and the absence of an accessibility statement.

Lloyd also alleged that Facebook tracked her activity on third-party websites while she was logged out, including activity involving Chewy.com and Target.com. She claimed that Facebook users, allegedly led by Joshua Thornsbery, harassed and threatened her, posted personal information and photographs, and made threats of physical harm. Her First Amended Complaint asserted claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, as well as claims for fraud, invasion of privacy, breach of contract, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Preliminary motions and documents

The court denied Lloyd’s motion to compel a required conference between the parties and her motion for administrative relief seeking sanctions. The court explained that the required conference was not yet due because no case-management conference or scheduling order was then pending. It also concluded that the circumstances did not support the requested sanctions.

The court granted the defendants’ request to take judicial notice of, and incorporate by reference, Meta’s Terms of Service and Data Policy. The court found that Lloyd’s complaint referred extensively to the Terms of Service, that the documents were central to her claims, and that the publicly accessible documents’ authenticity was not disputed. The court denied Lloyd’s motion to strike the defendants’ dismissal motion because those documents could properly be considered without converting the motion into a request for summary judgment.

Claims against Mark Zuckerberg

The court granted the defendants’ motion as to claims against Zuckerberg. Lloyd alleged in conclusory terms that Zuckerberg should be liable because he was Meta’s chief executive officer and was personally involved in or directed the challenged conduct. The court found those allegations insufficient. It also rejected the alter-ego theory because Lloyd alleged no facts addressing the factors needed to treat Zuckerberg and the company as legally the same, such as commingling funds, inadequate capitalization, disregard of corporate formalities, or lack of separate records.

Disability claims

The court granted the motion to dismiss the Americans with Disabilities Act claim. For a claim under Title III, the court explained, the defendant must own, lease, or operate a place of public accommodation. In the Ninth Circuit, those places generally are limited to physical spaces, with a narrow exception when a website’s inaccessibility interferes with access to services at a physical location. The court found no such physical location or connection in Lloyd’s allegations about Facebook’s online social-media platform.

The court also granted the motion to dismiss the Rehabilitation Act claim. Section 508 of that Act concerns accessibility in federal departments and agencies, while Meta and Facebook were private entities and Zuckerberg was an individual.

The court granted the motion to dismiss the Unruh Act claim. Because the ADA claim failed, Lloyd could not maintain the Unruh claim through that ADA theory. The court also found that Lloyd had not alleged specific facts showing intentional disability discrimination; statements that the defendants acted with discriminatory intent and treated her differently because of her disability were only conclusions.

Fraud and related claims

The court granted the motion to dismiss the fraud and intentional-misrepresentation claims, treating them as one fraud claim. Lloyd relied on statements in Facebook’s Terms of Service and related policies that Facebook was committed to safety and privacy. The court found that she had not alleged facts supporting a reasonable inference that Facebook intended to defraud her. Her statements that the defendants’ conduct was fraudulent and intentional did not satisfy the heightened pleading requirement for fraud.

The court granted the motion to dismiss the negligence and negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims in full under Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act. That provision generally protects an interactive computer service from claims treating it as the publisher of content created by another user. The court found that Meta and Facebook were interactive computer service providers, that the alleged threats and other harmful material were created by users, and that Lloyd’s claims were based on the defendants’ alleged failure to remove or moderate that third-party content.

The court also dismissed the invasion-of-privacy claim to the extent it treated Meta or Facebook as the publisher of third-party content.

Breach of contract

The court granted the motion to dismiss the breach-of-contract claim. Lloyd relied on Facebook’s general statements that it did not allow harmful content, sought to protect privacy, and would take action concerning harmful conduct. The court held that those general monitoring policies were not a sufficiently clear and specific promise to support contract liability. Lloyd also did not allege that Facebook specifically acknowledged her reports and promised to resolve the violations.

Tracking and privacy claims

The court granted the motion to dismiss the privacy claims based on Facebook’s alleged tracking of Lloyd while she was logged out. California privacy claims require, among other things, a reasonable expectation of privacy and an intrusion highly offensive to a reasonable person. The court distinguished an earlier related decision because Facebook’s current Data Policy expressly stated that partners could send information about activities outside Facebook whether or not a person had a Facebook account or was logged in. Based on that policy, the court found that Lloyd had not plausibly alleged a reasonable expectation that such information would not be collected.

Disposition

Judge Edward M. Chen granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint, with leave to amend the breach-of-contract claim within 30 days. The court stated that Lloyd could file a new third amended complaint if she chose to amend. Her motion to file a second amended complaint was therefore moot. The order disposed of Docket Nos. 18, 21, 23, 29, and 30.