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N.D. Cal.Substantive rulingFiled Oct. 6, 2022

Charles v. Target Corporation

Judge
Haywood Gilliam
Docket
4:20-cv-07854
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
9
Premises liabilitySummary JudgmentTort
In one sentence

In Charles v. Target Corporation, Judge Gilliam denied Target’s summary-judgment motion in Cheryl Charles’s slip-and-fall lawsuit.

Who this affects

Cheryl Charles and Target Corporation. Target’s motion was denied, leaving Charles’s premises-liability claim unresolved for further proceedings.

What happened

Cheryl Charles sued Target Corporation after she slipped and fell while shopping at a Target store in Colma, California. She brought one claim alleging that Target was responsible for unsafe property conditions.

Target argued that Charles had no evidence of a dangerous condition, that Target lacked notice of any hazard, and that a California law about recreational use of property applied. Charles presented testimony that the floor felt unusually slippery, an employee’s reported comment about baby powder, an incident report, and evidence that the area had not been inspected for at least 27 minutes before the fall.

In Charles v. Target Corporation, Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. denied Target’s motion for summary judgment. The judge found genuine factual disputes about whether a hazardous condition existed, whether Target had notice, and whether Charles’s alleged failure-to-warn theory involved willful conduct; the case was not resolved at this stage.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Charles v. Target Corporation · No. 4:20-cv-07854
Judge
Haywood Gilliam
Date
Oct. 6, 2022

Background

Cheryl Charles initially filed this slip-and-fall case in San Mateo County Superior Court. Target Corporation removed it to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. Charles alleges that she slipped and fell while shopping at a Target store in Colma, California. Her complaint asserts one cause of action for premises liability.

Target moved for summary judgment, which asks the court to rule before trial that no genuine dispute of important facts requires a trial. Target argued that Charles could not show that a dangerous condition existed, that Target had actual or constructive notice of such a condition, or that California Civil Code § 846 applied to her shopping trip.

Premises-Liability Claim

Under California law, premises liability generally requires proof that the defendant owed a duty of reasonable care, breached that duty, caused the plaintiff’s injury, and caused damages. A store owner is not an insurer of customers’ safety but must use reasonable care to keep the premises reasonably safe.

The court found a genuine factual dispute about whether a hazardous condition existed. Charles testified that, immediately after falling, she touched the floor and felt “a silkiness, almost like being on a waxed floor.” She also testified that a Target employee touched the floor and said it felt like there was baby powder on it. The incident report stated that there was baby powder on the floor.

Target argued that Charles’s testimony was speculation and that the employee’s alleged statements and the incident report were hearsay, meaning out-of-court statements offered as evidence of what they assert. The court concluded that it could consider the evidence at the summary-judgment stage because it could potentially be presented in an admissible form at trial. The court identified possible exceptions for the employee’s statement as a present-sense impression and for the incident report as a recorded recollection. Viewing reasonable inferences in Charles’s favor, the court found at least one genuine dispute about whether a hazardous condition existed.

Notice of the Condition

California law requires a premises-liability plaintiff to show that the property owner had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. Constructive notice means that the condition existed long enough, or was otherwise discoverable through reasonable care, that the owner should have found and corrected it.

Charles relied on surveillance video and deposition testimony indicating that Target did not inspect or perform maintenance in the area where she fell for at least 27 minutes before the incident. She also argued that Target had not shown compliance with its maintenance policies, including daily inspections, dust-mopping, and maintenance logs.

Target responded that there was no visible evidence of a hazard, no one else fell, and an inspection would not necessarily have revealed any substance on the floor. The court held that the nature and obviousness of the alleged hazard were issues for the factfinder, such as a jury, and that these arguments did not eliminate the factual dispute. The court therefore found another basis preventing summary judgment.

California Civil Code § 846

Charles’s complaint referred to a willful failure to warn under California Civil Code § 846. That statute generally provides limited protection to landowners for premises-liability claims involving people who enter private property for recreational purposes, subject to exceptions including a willful or malicious failure to warn.

The court agreed that it was unclear whether § 846 applied to this case because Charles entered Target while shopping, not for an identified recreational purpose. Charles appeared to argue that Target could still be liable for a willful failure to warn. The court explained that such a theory requires proof that Target knew or should have known about the hazardous condition, knew or should have known that injury was probable, and consciously failed to act to avoid or correct the condition. Because Target did not challenge Charles’s ability to prove those elements, and because factual disputes remained, the court also declined to grant summary judgment on that basis.

Disposition

The court DENIED Target Corporation’s motion for summary judgment. It also set a telephonic case-management conference for October 25, 2022, and directed the parties to meet and confer and submit a joint case-management statement. The order did not decide which party would ultimately prevail on the premises-liability claim.

The authoritative version

Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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