Robertson v. Doe

Background

Reginald Robertson, a pretrial detainee proceeding without a lawyer, brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against staff at Santa Rita Jail and Alameda County. The court previously found that his third amended complaint stated claims for retaliation and violation of due process, exercised supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, and ordered certain defendants to respond to the claims. After briefing, the court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and entered judgment.

Robertson then filed a motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), along with a request for judicial notice of an Alameda County Sheriff’s Office policy and procedure concerning inmate counts. The defendants opposed both filings.

Motion for Reconsideration

The court explained that reconsideration after a final judgment is available only on recognized grounds, such as an intervening change in controlling law, newly discovered evidence, fraud, a void judgment, satisfaction of the judgment, or another extraordinary reason warranting relief. Mere disagreement with the court’s decision is not enough.

Robertson argued that the court had failed to address a First Amendment free-speech claim based on Defendant Bussell’s alleged threat of disciplinary action. The court rejected that argument because the complaint described only a verbal dispute in which both men threatened a “write-up.” It did not explain that Bussell’s statement was prompted by Robertson’s exercise of free speech, and Bussell did not impose discipline afterward. The court also found that the allegation did not support retaliation because Robertson alleged neither an adverse action nor a chilling effect. The motion for reconsideration on this issue was DENIED.

Robertson also challenged the court’s rejection of his retaliation claim, asserting that Bussell announced a non-contact visit and opened Robertson’s cell door, thereby setting the later events in motion. The court stated that the undisputed evidence showed Bussell left shortly after his replacement arrived and was not present while Robertson and another inmate were accidentally locked in a visiting booth for several hours. The court found no evidence that Bussell directed or arranged the prolonged detention. It therefore concluded that it had not erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants on the retaliation claim. The motion for reconsideration on this issue was DENIED.

Robertson sought a ruling on his state-law claims while his criminal proceeding was pending. The court denied that request because it had correctly determined that the state-law claims were barred by Robertson’s failure to comply with the California Tort Claims Act’s filing requirements. The court stated that those claims had been properly dismissed with prejudice and that there was no basis for a stay.

Robertson argued that Technician Goodall’s declaration contained factual misrepresentations and that she was not assigned to the relevant housing unit. The court assumed it could consider the asserted evidence but found it insufficient to create a triable issue or justify reconsideration. It explained that Goodall’s lack of an official assignment to the housing unit did not contradict her statement that she was present there temporarily as a meal-relief technician. The court also found that Robertson’s failure to see Goodall did not establish that she was absent, because there was no line of sight between Robertson’s location in the visiting area and Goodall’s location in Housing Control.

Finally, Robertson argued that jail policies and procedures showed that defendants should have known where he was and therefore intentionally kept him in the visiting booth. The court found that the policies and procedures, at most, supported a negligence theory. It stated that negligence is not actionable under § 1983 and that the record instead showed Robertson and another inmate were kept in the booth unintentionally and accidentally.

Request for Judicial Notice

The court DENIED the request for judicial notice. It found that Robertson was attempting to submit new evidence without explaining why it could not have been discovered earlier through reasonable diligence. The court also found no evidence supporting Robertson’s assumption that defendants followed the cited inmate-count procedures on the evening in question or that those procedures showed they knew his location. Even failure to follow the procedures, the court stated, would amount to negligence rather than a § 1983 violation.

Disposition

Judge Beth Labson Freeman DENIED Robertson’s motion for reconsideration and DENIED his request for judicial notice. The order states that Robertson may appeal to the Ninth Circuit and that the order terminates Docket Nos. 65 and 66.