G. v. City of Lafayette

Background

The plaintiffs—Audrey G., Devin. G., Jesse B., and James Larry Benton—alleged that a May 6, 2020 incident began at a store in Lafayette, California, and continued on Highway 24 into Alameda County. According to the Third Amended Complaint, store employees incorrectly identified the plaintiffs as four armed Black male robbers and called the Lafayette police.

The complaint alleged that one police car, allegedly driven by Officer Kevin White, swerved in front of and behind Benton’s car, followed too closely, repeatedly shined a blinding spotlight into the car, and engaged in other dangerous maneuvers while Benton was driving 65 miles per hour. It alleged that a second police car, allegedly driven by Officer Neil Black, followed closely behind and at one point boxed Benton’s car between the two police cars. The police cars did not activate their lights or sirens or otherwise direct Benton to stop.

The plaintiffs sued White, Black, the City of Lafayette, and other defendants. Black was named for the first time in the Third Amended Complaint. He moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not allege enough facts to plausibly support a legal claim.

Service of process

Black argued that the claims against him were time-barred because he was served 127 days after the Third Amended Complaint was filed, rather than within the period specified by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). The court found that the plaintiffs should have served him earlier, but Black had been served by the time of the motion, had not argued that the delay prejudiced him, and had had a meaningful opportunity to challenge the claims. The court therefore extended the service period and evaluated the claims rather than dismissing them for untimely service.

Federal civil-rights claim under Section 1983

The plaintiffs relied on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute that allows claims for violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights. They alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause.

For equal protection, the court explained that the plaintiffs had to allege intentional differential treatment based on membership in a protected class. The court held that the allegations against Black were too conclusory. Unlike the allegations against White, the complaint did not say that Black shined a light into the plaintiffs’ car or otherwise interacted with them in a way that supported a reasonable inference that he could see they did not match the reported description or that he intended to discriminate against them because of their race.

For due process, the plaintiffs had to allege conduct that was so egregious and outrageous that it shocked the conscience. The court held that the allegations against Black—that he drove closely behind Benton and that Benton’s car was boxed in—did not meet that standard. The most serious conduct, including swerving around the car, repeatedly shining a spotlight inside it, making dangerous maneuvers, and laughing when Benton asked whether he should pull over, was attributed to White. The court also held that the allegations against Black did not support liability under the state-created danger theory because the facts supporting that theory were specific to White.

The court dismissed the Section 1983 claim against Black.

State-law claims

The court discussed Black’s statute-of-limitations argument concerning the state-law claims but did not decide that issue. It instead dismissed those claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and allowed the plaintiffs to amend because this was their first opportunity to test the claims against Black.

Ralph Act claim. The Ralph Civil Rights Act protects against violence or intimidation by threat of violence because of characteristics including race. The court held that the complaint did not plausibly allege that Black threatened or committed violence because of the plaintiffs’ race. The allegations about the most threatening driving conduct and the spotlight were directed at White, and the complaint did not allege facts supporting a reasonable inference that Black could see inside the car, recognize that the plaintiffs did not match the description, or perceive their race. The court dismissed the Ralph Act claim against Black.

Bane Act claim. The Tom Bane Civil Rights Act addresses interference with rights secured by federal or California law through threat, intimidation, or coercion. The court held that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged that Black violated a constitutional right or acted with the specific intent to do so. The court dismissed the Bane Act claim against Black.

Intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court held that the complaint did not plausibly allege that Black engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct, intended to cause emotional distress, or recklessly disregarded the risk of causing it. The complaint attributed the swerving, spotlight, and other conduct that had supported a claim against White to White, not Black. The court dismissed the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim against Black.

Negligence. A negligence claim requires a duty, breach, causation, and damages. The court held that the allegations supporting a duty and breach—such as swerving around the car and blinding Benton with a spotlight while driving 65 miles per hour—were pleaded against White, not Black. The allegations that Black drove closely behind the car were insufficient. The court dismissed the negligence claim against Black.

Disposition

Judge William H. Orrick granted Black’s motion to dismiss with leave to amend. The plaintiffs’ amended complaint was due within 20 days of the order’s issuance. The order addressed the claims against Black.