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N.D. Cal.Procedural orderFiled Oct. 31, 2022

Google LLC v. Sonos, Inc.

Judge
Donna Ryu
Docket
3:20-cv-06754
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
8
DiscoveryCivil Procedure
In one sentence

In Google LLC v. Sonos, Inc., Judge Ryu denied Google’s motion to compel a corporate witness because its deposition topic sought Sonos’s legal conclusions and trial strategy.

Who this affects

Google’s motion to compel was denied, so Sonos was not required by this order to designate a witness for Google’s Rule 30(b)(6) Topic No. 6. Sonos had agreed to provide a witness about the negotiation and execution of the Content Integration Agreement.

What happened

In Google LLC v. Sonos, Inc., Google asked the court to require Sonos to designate a corporate witness for a deposition about agreements governing the companies’ collaborations, including the scope of their Content Integration Agreement. The dispute arose in a patent case that also includes Google’s breach-of-contract and conversion claims.

Sonos refused to provide a witness for the topic, arguing that it sought legal interpretations, legal theories, privileged information, and trial strategy. Google said it was seeking the factual basis for Sonos’s position about what the agreement covered and offered to revise the topic.

Judge Ryu denied Google’s motion to compel. The court held that the proposed topic sought Sonos’s legal contentions, contract interpretations, and conclusions, and that Google’s proposed revision would improperly seek Sonos’s trial strategy.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Google LLC v. Sonos, Inc. · No. 3:20-cv-06754
Judge
Donna Ryu
Date
Oct. 31, 2022

Background

Google brought the case seeking declarations that it did not infringe and that four Sonos patents were invalid. The case concerns wireless multi-room audio systems. Google also asserted breach-of-contract and conversion claims based in part on its allegations that Sonos improperly claimed ownership of technology developed or exchanged during the companies’ collaboration.

The discovery dispute concerned Rule 30(b)(6), which allows a party to depose an organization through a witness prepared to testify about specified topics. Google’s Topic No. 6 concerned the agreements governing the companies’ collaborations, including the Content Integration Agreement; Sonos’s understanding of the scope of a provision concerning “Provider Developments”; whether functionality or information exchanged during the collaboration was covered by the agreement; and the people most knowledgeable about the topic.

Sonos interpreted “collaborations” as referring to the parties’ work on an application allowing Google’s music service to play through Sonos’s music system. Sonos objected that the topic sought attorney-client or work-product-protected information and legal opinions about contract interpretation. Sonos refused to provide a witness on the topic but had agreed to produce a witness about the facts and circumstances surrounding the agreement’s negotiation and execution.

Parties’ Arguments

Google argued that the agreement’s scope was important to its contract and conversion claims and to several defenses, including unclean hands, equitable estoppel, waiver, implied license, exhaustion, and limitation of liability. Google said it was seeking the factual basis for Sonos’s position about what the agreement covered. It proposed revising the topic to request all facts supporting any position Sonos intended to take about the agreement and its scope.

Sonos argued that both the original topic and Google’s proposed revision sought Sonos’s legal theories, contract interpretations, the facts supporting its legal positions, and trial strategy. It also argued that the proposed revision broadened the topic rather than fixing the problem.

Court’s Analysis

The court agreed with Sonos. It held that the original topic improperly requested testimony about Sonos’s legal contentions, theories, and interpretations. In particular, requests for Sonos’s “understanding” of the agreement’s scope and of whether certain functionality or information was covered sought contract interpretation and legal conclusions rather than appropriate factual testimony.

The court explained that even a request framed as seeking the factual basis for Sonos’s understanding would still improperly seek legal conclusions or protected information. The court distinguished a case in which discovery concerned historical facts about an insurer’s representations, actions, and handling of claims. Here, Google sought corporate testimony about contract interpretation and about which facts supported Sonos’s legal conclusions.

The court also held that Google’s proposed compromise did not cure the problem because it asked Sonos to disclose its trial strategy.

Disposition

The court denied Google’s motion to compel. The order did not require Sonos to provide a witness for Topic No. 6.

The authoritative version

Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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